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Admiralty: Burden of proof when tug returns tow or cha;rterer returns
vessel in damaged condition: Carriers: Bailments.-In Turecamo Tow-
ing Corp. v. The United States, 125 F. (2d) 1001, 1942 Atm. Mar. Cas.
254 (C. C. A. 2d 1942), the libellant claimed the balance due jvpder a contract
of towage. Respondent counterclaimed in general terms, coniending that the
tow was delivered to the tug in good condition, that it was damaged when
returned to it, and that the petitioner owed more for damages than was due
on the towage contract. The District Court dismissed the counterclaim because
of the general character of the allegations.- On appeal, the respondent having
amended his answer to state the essential facts relied upon to establish the
tug's negligence, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court. The
upper court held that the respondent, to recover, must allege and prove the
negligence of the tug, since the latter was not a bailee. Judge Clark, concurring,
was of the opinion that if the tug was in complete control of the tow, which
had no attendants of the owner aboard, the tug should have the burden of
going forward on proof of delivery to the tug in good condition, and return in
damaged condition. 2 The problem has perplexed the admiralty.
The action by the tow against the tug to recover for injury to the tow caused
by the tug's negligence is ex delicto, and not ex contractu3 Thus, in addition
to showing the towage contract from which the tug's duties to use reasonable
care arise, the libellant must allege and prove specific acts of negligence on
which to base his claim.4
In Stevens v. The White City.5 the rule was laid down that a tug is not a
bailee of its tow, and consequently the tow must always have the burden of
proving the negligence of the tug. In that case the court said also that the
mere fact that the tow was unattended was immaterial. 6 The tug is not re-
garded as having the exclusive control over the tow as is ordinarily essential
to a bailment, but only such control as is necessary to enable the tug and those
in charge of her to fulfill the engagement.7 The tug is neither an insurer nor
common carrier." It has been held that the "burden is always upon him who
'Turecamo Towing Corp. v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 820 (E. D. N. Y. 1940).
21942 Am. Mar. Cas. 254, 257.
3Stevens v. The White City, 285 U. S. 195, 201, 52 Sup. Ct. 347 (1932) ; Simkins v.
R. L. Morrison & Sons, 107 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 5th 1939); New Orleans Coal & Bisso
Towboat Co. v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 53, 60-61 (C. C. A. 5th 1936), cert. denied, 300
U. S. 676, 57 Sup. Ct. 669 (1936).4Stevens v. The White City, 285 U. S. 195, 52 Sup. Ct. 347 (1932) ; The Steamer Webb,
14 Wall. 406, 414 (U. S. 1871) ; The Anita D, 28 F. Supp. 361 (E. D. La. 1939) ; The
Edmund L. Levy, 128 Fed. 683, 686 (C. C. A. 2d 1904) ; The McCaldin Bros., 213 Fed.
211 (C. C. A. 2d 1914).
5285 U. S. 195, 52 Sup. Ct. 347 (1932).61d. at 201.
71d. at 200.
SSun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co., Inc., 287 U. S. 291, 294, 53 Sup. Ct. 135 (1932);
The Steamer Syracuse, 12 Wall. 167, 171 (U. S. 1870) ; Mengel Co. v. Thland Waterways,
34 F. Supp. 685 (E. D. La. 1940), Note (1941) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 303; New Orleans
Coal & Bisso Towboat Co. v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 53, 60 (C. C. A. 5th 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U. S. 676, 57 Sup. Ct. 669 (1937).
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alleges the brewvch of such a contract to show either that there has been no
attempt at pert -mance, or that there has been negligence, or unskillfulness to
his injury in t- ,performance." The tug is held only to exercise that degree
of skill, care at d prudence that navigators usually employ for the performance
of similar serviee3
Although tht tug is a private carrier, and theoretically, at least, able to make
its own contract terms," whether it can lawfully contract to exculpate itself
from liability for its own negligence remains a somewhat open question. In
The Steamer Syracuse,12 the Supreme Court squarely held such an attempt
invalid, recognizing at the same time that the tug was neither a common carrier
nor a bailee. Again, in Compania de Navegacion Interior v. Firemen's Fund
Insurance Comipany,13 the court incidentally, if not squarely, affirmed the
doctrine of the former case, saying that, in spite of the agreement whereby the
tug was not to be responsible for loss or damage to the tow, the tug would be
liable if through the negligence of those in charge the tow suffered damage.
If it be intimated that Sun Oil Company v. Dalzell Towing Company, Inc.,
14
may have modified the other two cases, it is submitted, however, that the last
case stands alone on its peculiar facts. The contract of towage included a
coverant that when the tug's captain went aboard the tow, he was to become
the servant of the owners of the tow, and neither the tugs nor owners were to be
liable for any damage resulting during that time. This was upheld, the court
expressly stating that it was not in conflict with The Steamer Syracuse or
Compania de Navegacion I.n.terior v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Company.' 5
Where, without fault on the part of the tow, it is damaged, and damage
would not ordinarily occur if the same service were performed with reasonable
care and diligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied in favor of the
tow.'0 In such cases, at least, the tow is given the benefit of a prinia facie
case of negligence against the tug, and the burden of going forward to explain
is placed on the tug.17 Where damage occurs after the tug has deviated from
OThe Steamer Webb, 14 Wall. 406, 414 (U. S. 1871).
'OStevens v. The White City, 285 U. S. 195, 52 Sup. Ct. 347 (1932) ; The J. P. Donald-
son, 167 U. S. 599, 17 Sup. Ct. 951 (1897) ; Doherty v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 269 Fed.
959 (C. C. A. 2d 1920) ; The Margaret, 94 U. S. 494 (1876) ; The Cayuga, 16 Wall. 177,
183 (U. S. 1872) ; Transportation Line v. Hope, 95 U. S. 297 (1877).
lTen Eyck v. Director General of Railroads, 267 Fed. 974 (C. C. A. 2d 1920). Cf.
Mylroie v. British Columbia Mills Tug & Barge Co., 268 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 9th 1920),
aff'd on other grounds, 259 U. S. 1, 42 Sup. Ct. 430 (1922) ; The Sea Lion, 12 F. (2d) 124
(N. D. Cal. 1926).
1212 Wall. 167 (U. S. 1870).
13277 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 459 (1928). The action was by the insured tug against the
insurance company, and the latter defended on the ground that the clause cut off its right
to be subrogated to the tow's cause of action.
14287 U. S. 281, 53 Sup. Ct. 135 (1932).
1 5 d. at 295.
16The Steamer Webb, 14 Wall. 406, 414 (U. S. 1871). See, ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY
(1939) 669.
17The Reichert Line, 64 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 2d 1933) ; Fjreman's Fund Insurance Co.
v. Igert, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 205 (W. D. Ky. 1941) ; Kiernan v. Lake Champlain Trans. Co.,
273 Fed. 499 (C. C. A. 2d 1921); Simkins v. R. L. Morrison & Sons, 107 F. (2d) 121
(C. C. A. 5th, 1939) ; The Kalkaska, 107 Fed. 959, 962 (C. C. A. 2d 1901).
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its course,18 or where the tug's equipment fails because of a defect,19 or where
the tug is in some other manner unseaworthy, ° the tow is also entitled to a
presumption in its favor. The mere fact that the tow sinks, however, does not
raise a presumption ;21 its owner must allege and prove negligence by the tug.
Yet in one case, where an empty, unattended lighter was delivered to the tug,
to be taken to a designated place for loading, and then to be returned, it was
held that the tug was a bailee, and responsible as such.22
While the tug is held to exercise reasonable care, and its master to know the
prudent methods of navigation,2 several defenses are open to the tug when
it is libelled. A sudden, unexpected squall, for example, is a peril of the sea,
and the tug is not liable for damage caused proximately by it.24 Similarly, it
is not liable for mere errors of judgment of its master.25 Inevitable accident,
as where failure of machinery is explained, is excusable.2 6 Other defenses
include contributory negligence on the part of the tow,2 7 and negligence by
third persons, such as a draw-bridge engineer in not opening the bridge wide
enough.28  Nor is the tug responsible where the tow is shown to be unsea-
worthy, the tug not being an insurer.2 9 Similarly, where the master of the tug
lacks authority to go beyond a designated point,30 or where the tug yields to
express demands of the tow,31 or where the tow is grounded on an uncharted
18 The Steamer Webb, 14 Wall. 406 (U. S. 1871) ; The Kalkaska, 107 Fed. 959 (C. C. A.
2d 1901) ; The Arlington, 19 F. (2d) 285 (C. C. A. 2d 1927) ; The Defender, 15 F. (2d)
377 (C. C. A. 2d 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 761; The Coastwise, 233 Fed. 1 (C. C. A.
1st 1916).
19The Westchester, 254 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 2d 1918) ; The Enterprise, 228 Fed. 131(D. Conn, 1915); The William E. Reed, 104 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 2d 1939).2OMengel Co. v. Inland Waterways, 34 F. Supp. 685 (E. D. La. 1940), Note (1941)
26 CORNELL L. Q. 303.21King v. Red Star Towing and Trans. Co., 48 F. (2d) 633 (E. D. N. Y. 1931) ; The
Oak, 152 Fed. 973 (C. C. A. 4th 1907); The Bear, 11 F. (2d) 607 (E. D. N. Y. 1925),
aff'd, 11 F. (2d) 608 (C. C. A. 2d 1926).22Sinram Bros., Inc. v. Reading Co., 18 F. Supp. 109 (E. D. N. Y. 1937).23The Fort George, 183 Fed. 731, 733 (C. C. A. 2d 1910), cert. denied, 219 U. S. 589(1910) ; The Margaret, 94 U. S. 494 (1876) ; The Stirling Tomkins, 56 F. (2d) 740, 742(C.C.A. 2d 1932), cert. denied, 286 U. S. 556 (1932) ; The Allie & Evie, 24 Fed. 745
(S. D. N. Y. 1885).24The Rob, 32 F. Supp. 195 (E. D. N. Y. 1940) ; The William E. Gladwish, 196 Fed. 490
(C. C. A. 2d 1912).
5The Elizabeth Jones, 112 U. S. 514, 526, 5 Sup. Ct. 468 (1884) ; The Stirling Tomkins,
56 F. (2d) 740, 741 (C. C. A. 2d 1932) ; cert. denied, 286 U. S. 556 (1932) ; The William
E. 'Gladwish, 196 Fed. 490 (C. C. A. 2d 1912) ; Slyfield v. Penfold, 66 Fed. 362 (C. C. A.
6th 1895).2GThe burden of proving inevitable accident is on the tug. Great Lakes Towing Co. v.
American Shipbuilding Co., 243 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 6th 1917); The Rob, 32 F. Supp. 195
(E. D. N. Y. 1940) ; Reilly v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 214 Fed. 60 (C. C. A. 2d 1914).27Reilly v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 214 Fed. 60 (C. C. A. 2d 1914) ; The Westchester,
254 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 2d 1918) ; The Columbia, 109 Fed. 660 (C. C. A. 9th 1901); The
Oceanic, 74 Fed. 642 (C. C. A. 5th 1896), cert. denied, Hathaway & Co. v. Marts, 163
U. S. 689, 16 Sup. Ct. 1202 (1896).28The Passaic, 21 F. (2d) 80 (E. D. N. Y. 1926), aff'd, 21 F. (2d) 81 (C. C. A. 2d
1927) ; City of Chicago v. Mullen, 116 Fed. 292 (C. C. A. 7th 1902).
29The Oak, 152 Fed. 973 (C. C. A. 4th 1907) ; The Edmund L. Levy, 128 Fed. 683
(C. C. A. 2d 1904).
30The R. F. Cahill, Fed. Cas. No. 11,735 (S. D. N. Y. 1878).31West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Morgan Lumber Co., 188 Fed. 26 (C. C. A. 6th 1911).
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rock in the channel,3 2 the tug is not liable.
Distinct from the towage contract, the charter contract of the bare type boat
makes the charterer a bailee of the vessel. 33 The contract does not extend the
charterer's liability to that of an insurer, unless the terms of the charter clearly
so provide.34 Where the hirer had assumed an absolute obligation to return
the vessel, the Supreme Court in the leading case held that the contract was
controlling and enforceable according to its terms.3 5 The charter law therefore
conforms to the general law of bailment, under which a bailee for hire is not
responsible for failure to return the thing bailed, when it has been lost or
damaged without fault on his part.30 In both, the duty of care required is that
of reasonable, ordinary diligence under the circumstances.3 7 Thus, when the
charter does no more than express the same obligation the law imposes from
the facts of the transaction itself, the charterer is no further bound than had
the clause been left out.38 ". . . [T] he liability of the bailee is neither increased
nor changed" 39 by a simple covenant to return the chartered vessel in the same
condition as received, less wear and tear.
It is well settled that the charterer is liable to the owner for any damage
resulting from the former's own negligence or the negligence of any one to
whom he intrusts the ship.4° In an action against a sub-charterer, the owner's
action must be based on tort, however, and not on contract as it is possible
to do against the charterer, for there is no privity of contract between the
owner and the subcharterer.
41 
'
In sharp contrast with the towing cases, under which the tow is not entitled
to a presumption when the tow is returned in damaged condition, the owner
on proof of delivery to the charterer in good condition, and return in damaged
condition enjoys a presumption of negligence. As in the case of ordinary bail-
ment his proof has the effect of casting the burden on the charterer to go for-
ward and explain the injury.42 The presumption does not, of course, deprive
3 2The Arlington, 19 F. (2d) 285, 286 (C. C. A. 2d 1927).3 3 Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n. v. Moore, 183 U. S. 642, 22 Sup. Ct. 240 (1901);
The Johnson Lighterage Co. No. 24, 248 Fed. 74 (C. C. A. 3d 1918) ; The Moran No. 10,
41 F. (2d) 255 (S. D. N. Y. 1924) ; Murray Lighterage & Transp. Co., Inc. v. Pennsyl-
vania R. R. Co., 130 F. (2d) 199, 1942 Am. Mar. Cas. 1055 (C. C. A. 2d 1942). The
question arises in a charter of the bare boat type beciuse the charterer, furnishing his own
crev and supplies, has complete control of the vessel.
34The Johnson Lighterage Co. No. 24, 248 Fed. 74 (C. C. A. 3d 1918). The court said
at p. 80: "While in every charter there is an implied covenant to deliver up the vessel at
the end of the term, that covenant alone does not make the charterer an insurer." A
covenant to insure should be imposed only where it is found in the agreement by clear
and explicit language. Mulvaney, et al. v. King Paint Manufacturing Co., 256 Fed. 612
(C. C. A. 2d 1919).35Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n. v. Moore, 183 U. S. 642, 22 Sup. Ct. 240 (1901).
U6The Johnson Lighterage Co. No. 24, 248 Fed. 74, 80 (C. C. A. 3d 1918) ; The Moran
No. 10, 41 F. (2d) 255 (S. D. N. Y. 1924) ; Wintringham v. Hayes, 141 N. Y. 1, 38 N. E.
999 (1894) ; Powers and Son v. Jughardt, 101 App. Div. 53 (2d Dep't 1905).3 7 See cases cited supra note 36.38Mulvaney, et al. v. King Paint Manufacturing Co., 256 Fed. 612 (C. C. A. 2d 1919).
.3ld. at 615.40The Moran No. 10, 41 F. (2d) 255, 256 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).41The Lizzie D. Shaw, 92 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 764,
58 Sup. Ct. 410 (1937).42The Zeller No. 8, 46 F. Supp. 487 (E. D. N. Y. 1942) ; The Moran No. 10, 41 F.
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the charterer of usual defenses, including a breach of implied covenant of
seaworthiness by the owner of the vessel, 43 which can be waived by an express
clause. A mere inspection by the charterer has been held insufficient to waive
the implied condition. 4
4
In respect to the presumption of negligence as between owner and charterer,
two recent cases have shown the slight circumstances which are necessary to
entitle the owner to place the duty of explanation on the charterer. 45 In the
district court case, the owner chartered a scow to the respondent. The proof
of delivery in good condition by the owner, and return in damaged condition
by the respondent, raised a presumption of negligence in favor of the former.
the relationship was not as clear in the other case, the terms of the contract
not being indicated. However, the Second Circuit said: "The bailee of a scow
does not discharge himself of the duty thrown upon him by returning it dam-
aged, unless he offers some evidence to show, either how the injury happened
and that his negligence did not cause it; or that, however it did happen, his
fault had no part in it."46
Turning from the problem as it arises between tug and tow and owner and
charterer to the common carrier, we find the latter subject to a rigid rule in
favor of the shipper who intrusts his goods. 47 The burden of proof is upon the
common carrier to show that loss or damage suffered while the cargo was
bailed with him falls within a permitted exception, and he must explain the
loss and bring it within an exception. 48 Under'the Harter Act,49 which governs
the shipment of goods between ports in the United States, the carrier cannot
exempt himself from damage or loss arising from his' "negligence, fault, or
failure in proper loading, stowage, custody, care or proper delivery,"50 nor
from failure to properly "equip, man, provision and outfit" the carrying vessel,
nor from failure to make her "seaworthy and capable of performing her in-
(2d) 255 (S. D. N. Y. 1924) ; The Reno, 61 F. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 2d 1932). In the
last case, the court said at p. 969: "Upon proving the bailment and the return of the
barge damaged, the owner of the barge established a prima facie case, and the charterer
had the burden of coming forward with proof of no negligence on its part or by any one
to whom it had intrusted the barge."43The Caledonia, 157 U. S. 124, 15 Sup. Ct. 573 (1894) ; Patton-Tully Transp. Co. v.
Barrett, 37 F. (2d) 516 (C. C. A. 6th 1930). In the last case, the libellant was suing for
the hire. The respondent had returned the boat because of latent defects appearing after
using the chartered vessel for some time. In the contract, the charterer had agreed to
return the boat in good working order, and assumed full responsibility. The court said
at p. 522: "The broadest possible scope which might be given this provision of the charter
party would be to make the respondent responsible for the loss of the boat or for any
damage or injury to her which might be the result of negligence or causes other than sea-
worthiness." (Italics added.)44The Zeller No. 8, 46 F. Supp. 487 (E. D. N. Y. 1942).
45Ibid.; Murray Lighterage & Transp. Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 130 F. (2d) 199,
1942 Am. Mar. Cas. 1055 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).46Murray Lighterage & Transp. Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 130 F. (2d) 199,
1942 Am. Mar. Cas. 1055, 1056 (C. C. A. 2d 1942). Quaere, whether now the proper
pleading would be not to allege a mere contract of towage, but avoid Stevens v. The White
City by alleging a charter or bailment.47See generally, ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1939) § 71.48Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U. S. 296, 304, 55 Sup. Ct. 194 (1934).
4927 STAT. 445, 446, 46 U. S. C. 190-195 (1893).
5027 STAT. 445, 46 U. S. C. 190 (1893).
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tended voyage." 51 If due diligence is used to make the ship seaworthy, the
ship, its owners, and agents are not held responsible for damage resulting from
faults or errors in navigation or management of the vessel, and as at common
law, they are not liable for perils of the sea, acts of the enemy, etc. 52
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 53 which applies to carriage of goods
by sea in foreign trade to or from ports of the United States, differs but
slightly from the Harter Act in regard to exemptions of the carrier. Unless
caused by lack of due diligence to make the ship seaworthy, neither the ship
nor the carrier is liable for loss or damage resulting from unseaworthiness. 54
The burden is on the carrier to prove the exercise of due diligence. The
carrier is not liable for acts, neglect, or fault of the master or pilot in navigation
of the ship, nor for fire not caused by actual fault or privity of the carrier, as
well as other expressly excepted liabilities. 55 Under the 1936 Act, the carrier
is bound to make the ship seaworthy before and at the beginning of the
voyage. 0
Where the carrier accepts the cargo as being "in apparent good order and
condition," he has the burden of proving an exception if on delivery the cargo
is damaged. 57 The "proper vice" exception operates even under such a receipt,
however, and where the decay of a carg6 of corn was caused by its inherent
moisture, acidity, and rancidity, the court relieved the carrier though no specific
exception appeared in the bill of lading.58 Even if the carrier shows that the
loss is within an exception, the shipper may still prove negligence on the part
of the carrier to take the case out of the exception. 50 Similarly, where the cargo
when received is damaged, or when it is received as damaged cargo, the shipper
has the burden to prove receipt in good condition before the common carrier's
liability will attach.0°
It should be remembered that "[t] he burden of proof in a litigation, wherever
the law has placed it, does not shift with the evidence, and in determining
whether petitioner has sustained the burden the question often is . . . what
inferences of fact he may summon to his aid.
"The burden is not shifted, and if the bailee goes forward with evidence
enough to raise doubts as to the validity of the inference, which the trier of
fact is unable to resolve, the bailor does not sustain the burden of persuasion
5127 STAT. 445, 46 U. S. C. 191 (1893).
5227 STAT. 445, 46 U. S. C. 192 (1893).
5349 STAT. 1207-1208, 1210-1213, 46 U. S. C. 1300-1315 (1936). See KNAUTH, OCEAN
BILLS OF LADING (1941).
5449 STAT. 1210, 46 U. S. C. 1304 (1) (1936).
5549 STAT. 1210, 46 U. S. C. 1304 (2) (1936).5049 STAT. 1208, 46 U. S. C. 1303 (1) (1936).
57Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U. S. 296, 55 Sup. Ct. 194 (1934) ; The Nagisan Maru,
14 F. Supp. 1010 (E. D. N. Y. 1936) ; The City of Khios, 16 F. Supp. 923 (S. D. N. Y.
1936). For the purposes of the Harter Act, a barge and tug may be one "vessel" in
contemplation of law. Sacramento Navigation Co. v. Salz, 273 U. S. 326, 47 Sup. Ct.
368 (1926).
5S8The Nelson Traveler, 95 F. (2d) 286 (C. C. A. 9th 1938).50The City of Khios, 16 F. Supp. 923 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) ; The Maryland, 19 F. Supp.
505 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).




which rests upon him from the start., It is similar to res ipsa loquitur, but
does not avoid the requirement that upon the whole case he must prove the
breach by the preponderance of the evidence." 61
Reginald S. Oliver
Aviation: Low altitude flights over dwellings held to be trespasses and
enjoinable.-In 1930, by its decision in Smith v. New Envglnd Aircraft Co.,
Inc.,1 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts became the first court
of last resort since the advent of the aviation industry to decide a controversy
dealing with the extent of private interests in air space.2 In this case the
plaintiff landowner alleged that the defendants, who owned and operated
an adjoining airport, had committed numerous trespasses to the air space
above his land. This land was uncultivated and uninhabited. The height of
the flights varied from less than one hundred feet in landing and taking off
to more than a thousand feet in ordinary flight. At this time there were in
effect a state3 and a federal statute4 prohibiting flight below five hundred
feet. The court held that the flights over five hundred feet were not per se
trespasses. The federal statute was held constitutional as a valid exercise of
the interstate commerce power and the state statute was held to be a valid
exercise of the state police power. The flights under five hundred feet were
held to be trespasses, but the plaintiff was refused an injunction as he failed
to prove that he had sustained any damage to his property or to its use.
The theory of the court's decision seems to be that the landowner owns
that air space which is subject to his "possible effective possession." This
decision occasioned much dispute as to the proper theory for adjusting the
conflicting interests of the landowner and the aviator.5
Twelve years later the Massachusetts court, in Burnham v. Beverly Air-
ways, Inc., et al., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N. E. (2d) 575 (1942), affirmed its early
position. The court stated that in the Smith case "the just demands of
modern progress were recognized, and room was left for their reasonable
satisfaction, while at the same time protection was given to the landowner
61Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U. S. 104, 110-111,
61 Sup. Ct. 120' (1941), Note (1942) 42 COL. L. REV. 699.
-270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385, 69 A. L. R. 300 (1930).21n the two earliest cases the courts paid little or no attention to the problem of the
extent of private interests in air space. Commonwealth v. Nevin, 2 D. & C. Rep. 241,
1928 U. S. Av. R. 39 (Pa. 1922) (flight over posted land was not an entry upon the
land within the meaning of a criminal statute) ; Johnson v. Curtiss Airplane Co., et al.,
1928 U. S. Av. R. 42 (1923) (court refused to enjoin flights at 2000 feet, holding that
a contention that air'space at that altitude is a part of the realty was devoid of sub-
stantial mef it).3 MAss. STATS. (1922) c. 534.4AIR COMMERcE AcT OF 1926, 44 STAT. 10 (1926), 49 U. S. C. 171 (1941).5Hackley, Trespassers in the Sky (1937) 21 MINN. L. REV. 733; Hise, Ownership and
Sovereignty of the Air Space Above Landow)er's Premises with Special Reference to
Aviation (1931) 16 IOWA L. REV. 169; Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of
Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law (1932) 3 J. AIR L. 329.
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against that which he might naturally and justly regard as an unwarranted
intrusion." 6 The facts of the Burnham case were similar to those in the
Smith case except that in the later case the defendants were unnecessarily
flying above the plaintiff's dwelling house and cultivated land. Since the
decision in the Smith case the legislature of Massachusetts had enacted a
statute giving a privilege of flight through navigable air space, which is the
space above the minimum safe altitudes prescribed by the aeronautics com-
mission. 7 The court in reaching its decision relied partly on this statute
and partly on the S-nith case which was held not to be affected materially by
the statute. Flights over five hundred, feet were again held to be permissible
and flights under this height were trespasses. An injunction was granted,
despite the express finding that there was no nuisance, because the plaintiff
was able to prove that the flight constituted an interference with his enjoy-
ment of his land. The court did not find it necessary to discuss the possi-
bility of the defendant obtaining a prescriptive right as there was no allega-
tion of a uniform user. 7-
There are four theories of private interests in air space, any one of which
the Massachusetts court could have adopted in deciding the Smith and
Burnham cases. The problem is to reconcile the interests of a rapidly ex-
panding industry, which is already a vital part of our national defense, trans-
portation and postal systems, with the interests of the landowner. Adequate
recognition of this industry must necessarily curtail some of the landowner's
former enjoyment of his property.8 How much precedence is to be given
the aviation industry will depend upon a. balancing of the interests involved.
Before the twentieth century the common law maxim cjtus est soluin ejus
est usque ad coelum et ad inferos9 was relied upon by the courts in deter-
mining controversies involving private interests in air space. These early
6311 Mass. 628, 635, 42 N. E. (2d) 575, 579.
7 MAss. GEN. LAWS (1939) §§ 35 and 46.71In the Sith case the court stated that one could not obtain a prescriptive easement
of way in air space because there could be no uniform user. However, the aviator would
only have to follow substantially the same line, of flight as the law does permit a slight
divergence. Thus it is possible to obtain in air space a prescriptive easement of way or
the right to maintain a nuisance. Cheney v: O'Brien, 69 Cal. 199, 10 Pac. 479 (1886) ;
Walton v. Knight, 62 W. Va. 223, 55 S. E. 1025 (1908). 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY(3rd ed. 1939) § 1203.
In Hinman et aL. v. Pacific Air Transport Corp., 84 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 9th 1936),
cert. denied, 300 U. S. 654, 57 Sup. Ct. 116 (1937), the court argued against the possi-
bility of obtaining a prescriptive right in air space on the assumption that since no
prescriptive right can be gained in light and 'air in the United States none can be ob-
tained in air space. This is erroneous. The reason for the rule in the United States
is that a prescriptive right cannot be obtained unless there is a cause of action in the
servient estate. 4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, § 1201. The dominant estate must violate a
legal right belonging to the servient estate. If a landowner has a right not to be inter-
fered with in the enjoyment of his land then an aviator who interferes with such enjoy-
ment can obtain the right to maintain the interference.
8Under the police power -many restrictions on property owners' enjoyment of their
property have already been upheld. For a comprehensive discussion of these interferences
see Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., Inc., 270 Mass. 511, 522-525, 170 N. E. 385
(1930).
9"Whose is the soil, his it is from the heavens to the depths of the earth."
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cases only involved intrusions to space in close proximity to the ground.'0
Consequently, the maxim was merely dictum as a maxim is law only to the
extent that it is applied." A literal application of this doctrine would extend
the rights of a landowner into infinity, would be impracticable, would cause
endless confusion,12 and would present an insurmountable obstacle to the
aviatidn industry. Any privilege of flight under this theory, given to the
aviator by law, would be an interference with property rights and there
would have to be some legal justification for it. A state, by exercising its
police power,'may regulate the use of property, 3 and the federal government,
under its interstate commerce power, may regulate property affecting inter-
state commerce.' 4 However, the grant of this privilege is a taking of 'prop-
erty.15 Though private property may be taken for public purpose if due
compenshfion is made,' 6 it cannot be taken for a private purpose, 'e.g., to
permit a private individual to fly on a private flight. For these reasons the
ad coelum maxim has not been followed, either by the courts or by the legal
writers, and its validity as a theory of private interests in air space has gen-
erally been denied.Y7
A second theory of private interests in air space is that espoused by the
Restatehent of Torts18 and the Uniform Aeronautics Act.'0 This theory ad-
mits absolute ownership of air space but concedes a *right or privilege of
flight. It is a limited recognition of the ad coelum theory. The privilege
must be exercised reasonably and any unreasonable interference with the
landowner's use and 6njoyment of his land is a trespass.
'
0Smith v. Smith, 110 Mass. 302 (1872) (overhanging eaves); Harrington v. McCar-
thy, 169 Mass. 492, 48 N. E. 278 (1897) (overhanging eaves) ; Aiken and Ketchum v.
Benedict, 39 Barb. 400 (N. Y. 1863) (overhanging eaves); Hoffman v. Armstrong,
48 N. Y. 201, 8 Am. Rep. 537 (1872) (overhanging branches).
"1Swetland et al. v. Curtiss Airport Corp. et al., 41 F. (2d) 929, 937 (N. D. Ohio
1930), aff'd and modified, 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th 1932) ; Thrasher v. City ot
Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 529, 173 S. E. 817, 99 A. L. R. 158 (1934). Jeremiah Smith,
The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence (1885) 9 HARv. L. REv. 13.
12"A literal construction of this formula would bring about an absurdity. The sky
has no definite location. It is that which presents itself to the eye when looking upward;
as we approach it, it recedes. There can be no ownership of infinity, nor can equity
prevent a supposed violation of an abstract conception." Hinman et al. v. Pacific Air
Transport Corp., 84 F. (2d) 755, 757 (C. C. A. 9th 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 654,
57 Sup. Ct. 116 (1937); Swetland et al. v. Curtiss Airport Corp. et al., 55 F. (2d)
201 (C. C. A. 6th 1932); Smith v. New England Aircraft Corp., Inc., 270 Mass. 511,
170 N. E. 385 (1930) .
"3Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., Inc., 270 Mass. 511, 522, 170 N. E. 385, 390
(1930) and cases cited therein.
'
4United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (1940) ; Noble State Bank
v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 110, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1910) ; Swetland et al. v. Curtiss Air-
port Corp. et al., supra note 11.
'-
5 See the concurring opinidn of Russell, C.J., in Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, supra
note 11 at 532.
16U. S. Corsr. A-MEND. V, XIV, § 1. West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.,
295 U. S. 662, 671, 55 Sup. Ct. 894 (1934). Tuttle and Bennett, Extent of Power of
Coirqress Over Aviation (1931) 5 U. oF ClN. L. REv. 261.
17Ibid.
'SRESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 159.
19§§ 3 and 4, 11 U. L. A. 157 (1938). See Guith et al. v. Consumers Power Co., 36
F. Supp. 21, 22 (E. D. Mich. 1940).
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Under this theory the law recognizes that an easement of way through air
space has always existed, similar to the right of way existing over navigable
waters.20 The courts are defining for the first time the extent of the land-
owner's interests in air space. There is no question of an interference with
property rights which must be justified under the state police power or the
federal government's interstate commerce power as the landowner's interests
have always been limited by the easement of way through air space. The
five hundred foot limitation of the federal and state statutes is a restriction
on the aviator and is not the source of his privilege of flight.
Whether an aviator is within the scope of his privilege of flight depends
upon the use which is being made of the land below. Since it is practically
impossible for an aviator to know how every piece of land over which he
flies is being used he has no means of determining whether his conduct is
tortious. From the standpoint of the aviation industry this uncertainty is an
unreasonable burden.2 1
A third theory of private -interests in air space is the "possible effective
possession" theory.22 There is ownership of air space but only to the extent
the air space is needed in connection with the present and future use of land.
The ownership of air space is related to use and occupation. The extent of
ownership will depend fipon the facts of each case. The nature of this theory
shows that the courts that have applied it are reluctant to make any definite
ruling as to private rights in air space. An aviator m~y fly at what he be-
lieves to be a reasonable altitude only to find later that he has committed a
trespass. Under this theory the landowner is adequately protected but it
is too indefinite in its relation to the aviator.23
The fourth theory of private interests in air space is the theory of the
Hinman case or the "nuisance" theory.24 This theory, unlike the above three,
does not recognize ownership of air space unless there is an actual use or
20RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 193; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 937.21 PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 86.22This theory has been used in the following cases. Swetland et al. v. Curtiss Air-
port Corp. et al. and Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., Inc., both .rupra note 12;
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, supra note 11.23The Massachusetts court in both the Smith and Burtham cases has given some
weight to the statutory regulations relating to height of flight in determining what is
possible effective possession. The theory being that the designated height is a restriction
on the landowner. Actually the limitation of height is a restriction on the aviator and
is to protect persons and property from injury. In rural areas 500 feet is the minimum
height from which an aviator could make a successful forced landing. In populated
areas the aviator must fly at higher altitudes.
"We think the question [of rights in air space] is unaffected by the regulation promul-
gated by the Department of Commerce Act of 1926 (49 U. S. C. A. 171 et seq.), and
adopted by the State of Ohio, requiring aeronauts to fly in rural sections at a height
not less than 500 feet above the surface, for in our view that regulation does not deter-
mine the rights of the surface owner, either as to trespass or nuisance." Swetland et al.
v. Curtiss Airport Corp., et al., s-upra note 12 at 203; Cory v. Physical 'Culture Hotel,
14 F. Supp. 977 (W. D. N. Y. 1936) ; Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, .rupra note 11.24Hinman et al. v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 9th 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U. S. 654, 57 Sup. Ct. 116 '(1937) ; Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, Inc.,
supra note 22 semble.
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occupation of the air space. Any air space beyond this belongs to the public
at large. It, proceeds upon the premise that the essence of the legal right
to property is dominion over it. "Property must have been reclaimed from
the general mass of the earth, and it must be capable by its very nature of
exclusive possession."' 25 The landowner is protected against any use by
others of the air space above his land which constitutes an actual interference
with his possession or beneficial use of his land. The landowner has an
action in trespass only when some tangible property is damaged. For un-
reasonable interference with the enjoyment of his land, the owner of the
surface has an action for nuisance.
Above are the four theories of private interests in air space fr6m which
the Massachusetts court could choose in the Burnham case. It chose the
"possible effective possession" theory by its affirmance of the Smith case.
The court expressly rejected the nuisance theory of the Himnan case on the
ground that the theory it chose adequately protects the landowner and at
the same time recognizes the needs of the aviation industry.2 6 Under either
of these theories the same 'result would probably have been reached. In
order to arrive at a proper result under the "possible effective possession"
theory it was hot necessary to find that the defendant's conduct was a nui-
sance and so the court, with no discussion, adopted the master's finding of
no nuisance. However, if the Massachusetts court had committed itself to
the theory of the Himan case it would have been faced with the necessity
of finding that the defendant's conduct amounted to a nuisance, or giving
the plaintiff no relief, and in such case it would have given the nuisance
element more than the summary discussion afforded to it. Upon a careful
analysis it can be seen that the defendant's conduct could easily be termed
a nuisance. It was unnecessary and gave rise to noise which was frequent
and of sufficient duration and intensity so that the court held that the plain-
tiff could rightfully object to its continuance. Thus the noise did interfere
with the plaintiff's comfort and may have affected his health. In the Smith
case the court stated that noise to amount to a nuisance must be of sufficient
frequency, duration and intensity so as to be harmful to health or comfort.
If this formula were applied in the Burnham case a nuisance would be found.
There was an avoidable harm to health or comfort and these factors together
amount to a nuisance.27
25Hinman et al. v. Pacific Air Transport, supra note 24 at 758.
26311 Mass. 628, 635, 42 N. E. (2d) 575, 579.
27Dauberman v. Grant, !98 Cal. 586, 246 Pac. 319 (1926) (unnecessarily low smoke-
stack on factory held to be nuisance) ; De Blois v. Bowers, 44 F. (2d) 621 (D. C.
Mass. 1930): (in determining whether operation of steel galvanizing plant is a nui-
sance it must be considered whether defendant has dhne everything reasonably prac-
tical to avoid obnoxious fumes and odors-is his conduct unnecessary?); Sprague v.
Sampson, 120 Me. 353, 114 AtI. 305 (1921) (court discusses effect of devices to reduce
noise and dust from defendant's surfacing machine and concludes if such devices avail-
able and the defendant has not procured one his conduct may amount to a nuisance but
if such device is not available the defendant's conduct is not a nuisance).
RESTAT MENT, ToRTs (1939) § 826, "An intentional invasion of another's interest in
the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable . . . , unless the utility of the actor's
conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm." (Italics added.)
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 828, comment a. "When a person knows that his
[Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Of the four theories discussed above, that of the Himnan case seems better
able to reconcile the conflicting interests of the landowner and the aviation
industry. It does not recognize the ownership of air space other than by
occupation or actual use. Developments in aviation not now foreseeable
might well be hindered by any theory recognizing ownership in air space to
any extent. Since a person is not guilty of a nuisance until he has created
a condition which results in a relatively continuous interference with the
property rights of another, an aviator is in a better position in a jurisdiction
which has adopted the "nuisance" theory than in a jurisdiction adhering to
one of the other theories. Under both the "Restatement" theory and the
"effective possession" theory, an aviator may be held liable for a trespass
resulting from a single flight, even though made in good faith and in the
belief that he is keeping within the scope of his privilege of navigation or
that he has not intruded within the area of effective possession. Under the
"nuisance" theory, on the other hand, the aviator can make several flights
without liability, even though, if he persisted in such flights, liability would
ensue. In effect, he is given a period of time in which he can become ac-
quainted with the terrain below him, and with the activities and claims of
the surface owner, and he has an opportunity to adjust his flying habits
accordingly before laying himself open to liability.
Whatever usufructuary rights the landowner may have in air space are
adequately protected under the Hinman theory. He may maintain an action
for nuisance.2 8  The aviator is liable for his negligence and he may be prose-
cuted by the landowner for violating ziny federal or state criminal statute
regulating the height and character of flight. If necessary the courts may
-extend theories of fright and nervous shock and right of privacy as a further
protection to the landowner.2 9 Richard E. Macey
conduct will interfere with another's use or enjoyment of land, and it would be prac-
ticable for him to prevent or avoid part or all of the interference and still achieve his
purpose, his conduct lacks utility if he fails to take the necessary measures to avoid it."
(Italics added.)281f the aviator damages the property of the landowner the latter may maintain an
action for trespass. Rochester Gas & Electric Co. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N. Y.
Supp. 469 (Co. Ct. 1933). /2 9 Closely related to the subject discussed above are those cases in which a landowner
has erected upon his land a structure intended to impede the operation of an adjoining
airport. If the obstruction is neither a proper use and enjoyment of the land nor a
necessary use the courts will enjoin its continuance. City of Iowa City and United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Tucker, 1936 U. S. Av. R. 10,235 C. C. H. 1937 Aviation Law Service
71 1804 (1935): Pennsylvania v. Von Bestecki et al., 43 Dauphin County Rep. 446,
1937 U. S. Av. R. 1 (Pa. 1937) ; United Airports Company of California Ltd. v. Hin-
man et al., 1940 U. S. Av. R. 1, 235 C. C. H. 1937 Aviation Law Service 71 1829 (1939).
However, where the obstruction is a legitimate and bona fide use of the land neither
its construction nor continuance will be enjoined. Capitol Airways, Inc. v. Indianapolis
Power & Light Co., 215 Ind. 462, 1939 U. S. Av. R. 479 (1935) ; Air Terminal Proper-
ties v. City of New York, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 629, 1940 U. S. Av. R. 27 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
Guith et aL. v. Consumers Power Co., 36 F. Supp. 21 (E. D. Mich. 1940).
The problems arising in this line of cases should be considered in determining what
is the proper theory of private interests in air space.
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Conflict of laws: Workmen's compensation acts: Extra-territorial appli-
cation.-In Lepow v. Lepow Knitting Mills, 288 N. Y. 377, 43 N. E. (2d)
450 (1942), the salesman of a New York corporation was sent to South
Africa solely to promote the business of his employer, the selling of ladies'
frocks and "ready to wear" garments. While in Africa, the salesman died
from malignant tertian malaria, a disease prevalent in tropical regions
caused by the sting of a mosquito. It was conceded that the mosquito sting
was an accidental injury. The award under the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law was upheld on the ground that the risks incidental to
the salesman's itinerary through a region infested with such insects were
special in character and were related to his employment. The case suggests
the question: What extra-territorial effect do New York and other leading
jurisdictions give to their workmen's compensation laws ?1
There is no express provision in the New York act as to its extra-terri-
torial application. The New York policy, however, was early stated in
Matter of Post v. Burger and Gahlke2 that accidents are costs of carrying
on the business, and the work done under the contract of employment is as
beneficial to the employer when consummated beyond state lines as when
performed within the state. Accordingly, the New York compensation law
has been held applicable to injuries occurring outside the state when such
injuries arose in the course of an employment incidental or temporarily
related to the principal work carried on in New York.' Where the entire or
a substantial portion of the performance of the employment contract is to
take place in another jurisdiction, even though the contract was made in
New York, the New York act does not alply.4 Where the contract of em-
'In general, see recent notes discussing the extra-territorial application of workmen's
compensation acts: (1942) 5 U. OF DETROIT L. J. 67; (1940) 12 RocKY Mr. L. REv.
pp. 77-84; (1934) 12 NEB. L. BULL. 275; (1934) 13 CHi-KENT REV. 114; see further
annotation, "Extra-territorial operation of workmen's compensation statutes; conflict
of laws," (1933) 90 A. L. R. 119.
2216 N. Y. 544, 11 N. E. 351 (1916).3Post v. Burger and Gohlke,-supra, note 2; Matter of Smith v. Aerovane Utility
Corp., 259 N. Y. 126, 181 N. E. 172 (1932) ; Klein v. Stoller and Cook Co., 220 N. Y.
670, 116 N. E. 1005 (1917) ; ,Matter of Noel v. Morrison, 260 App. Div. 377, 22
N. Y. S. (2d) 849 (3d Dep't 1940); Madderns v. Fox Film Corp., 205 App. Div.
791, 200 N. Y. Supp. 344 (3d Dep't 1923), aff'd without opinion, 237 N. Y. 614, 143
N. E. 764 (1924).4Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622 (1930); Smith
v. Heine Safety Boiler Corp., 224 N. Y. 9, 119 N. E. 878 (1918). See also Jensen v.
Boudin Contracting Corp., 283 N. Y. 572, 27 N. E. (2d) 437 (1940) ; Zeltoski v. Osborne
Drilling Corp., 264 N. Y. 496, 191 N. E. 532 (1934) ; Amaxis v. Vassiloros, Inc.,
258 N. Y. 544, 180 N. E. 325 (1931) ; Thompson v. Foundation Co., 188 App. Div. 506,
177 N. Y. Supp. 58 (3d Dep't 1919); Gardner v. Horseheads Construction Co., 171
App. Div. 66, 156 N. Y. Supp. 899 (3d Dep't 1916).
But New York makes an exception to this rule when a contract of non-hazardous
employment, made within the state, is to be performed partially or wholly without
the state. The New York act has been held to apply to this "salesman" type of situ-
ation. Wagoner v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 274 N. Y. 593, 10 N. E. (2d) 567 (1937) ;
Ayers v. Dunn Pen and Pencil Co., 244 N. Y. 557, 155 N. E. 895 (1927); Roth v.
A. C. Horn Co., 262 App. Div. 922, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 808 (3d Dep't 1941), aff'd inez..
287 N. Y. 1 (1941).,
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ployment, moreover, is made outside the state and the injury occurs within
New York in the course of an employment which is incidental to the main
employment outside the state, New York does not apply its act to grant
compensation. 5 New Jersey likewise applies its own compensation act when
the employment contract is made within the state and injuries incidental to
such work occur outside the state.6 The New Jersey act has also been held
applicable to injuries occurring within the state where the employee was
hired in New York to do work partly in New York and partly in New
Jersey.7 The additional facts that the employee was a resident of New York
and the employer a New Jersey corporation do not change the result.8
The Massachusetts statute expressly states that it covers injuries occur-
ring outside the state when such injuries arise under an employment contract
made in Massachusetts. 9 The Maine statute has a similar provision.10 The
5Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., 227 N. Y. 531, 125 N. E. 675 (1920);
Whitmire v. Blaw-Knox Construction Co., 263 N. Y. 676, 189 N. E. 753 (1934); Proper
v. Polly, 233 App. Div. 621, 253 N. Y. Supp. 530 (3d Dep't 1931), aff'd without opinion,
259 N. Y. 516, 182 N. . 161 (1932). But see Matter of Grasso v. Donaldson-Reynolds,
Inc., 279 N. Y. 584, 17 N. E. (2d) 456 (1938) where the deceased employee, a New
Jersey resident employed by a New Jersey corporation, was fatally injured while work-
ing in New York. The award granted by the New York State Industrial Board to his
widow under the New York act was affirmed. The court was probably influenced by
the fact that the deceased had worked at this New York location on and off for over
five years, whenever his employer had worked there, and that he was paid in New
York and had worked steadily in New York for four months prior to the accident.
Such circumstances seem to make the New York employment something more than
merely "temporary and incidental."6Under the New Jersey Act, (N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 34, c. 15, §§ 1 to 120)
the employee's sole remedi against his employer for injuries arising out of and in the
course of his employment is for compensation by proceeding before the Workmen's
Compensation Bureau unless there is an agreement in writing or written notice given
by one party to the other prior to the accident to the effect that the provisions for
compensation shall not apply. (N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 34, c. 15, § 9). Deeny v.
Wright and Cobb Lighterage Co., 36 N. J. L. J. 121 (1913) ; Pitchenick v. New York
Folding Box Co., 128 N. J. L. 206, 21 A. (2d) 877 (1942) ; Steinmetz v. Snead and Co.,
123 N. J. L. 138, 8 A. (2d) 126 (1939) ; Frank Desiderio Sons v. Blunt, 11 N. J. Misc.
494, 167 Atl. 27 (1933). See also Steker v. American Stores Co., 125 N. J. L. 275,
15 A. (2d) 627 (1940).
7American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. L. 436, 92 Atl. 85, 94 Atl. 85 (1914),
aff'd without ophiion, 87 N. J. L. 314, 93 Atl. 1083 (1915); Miller v. National Chair
Co., 127 N. J. L. 414, 22 A. (2d) 804 (1941).
8Davidheiser v. Hoy Foundry and Iron Works, 87 N. J. L. 688, 94,Atl. 305 (1915).
But where the employee, laid off from the employer's New Jersey plant, later procured
employment at the employer's Louisiana plant, it was held this was a new contract of
employment made outside the state and the New Jersey statute did not cover an injury
suffered in the course of the Louisiana employment. See Franzen v. E. I. DuPont De
Nemours and Co., 128 N. J. L. 549, 27 A. (2d) 615 (1942).
9MAss. ANN. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 152, §§ 1 to 75; Wright's Case, 291
Mass. 334, 197 N. E. 5 (1935) ; Migue's Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847 (1933);
McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338 (1931) ; Pedersoli's Case, 269 Mass.
550, 169 N. E. 427 (1930). The statute as amended and the recent cases under it over-
rule the much cited and formerly authoritative case of In re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, 102
N. E. 693 (1913), which held that the benefits of the Massachusetts act applied only
to the injuries occurring within the state.
10Ma. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 55, § 2. Where the employee was injured while working
in Canada as an incident to his Maine employment, he was granted compensation under
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Vermont compensation act also provides that a'workman hired within the
state shall be entitled to compensation under the Vermont law even though
the injury was received outside the state." In Bradford v. Clapper,'2 the
contract of employment was made in Vermont, which was the employer's
principal place of business. The employee was killed in the course of his
employment while working in New Hampshire. It was held that the em-
ployer and employee tacitly accepted the Vermont act which provides that
the remedy where injury or death occurs in Vermont or elsewhere in the
course of his employment shall be exclusive under the compensation act.13
It was further held that the Vermont statutory agreement is a defense
available to the employer in an action for wrongful death, brought in New
Hampshire by the representative of the decedent, under the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution of the United States.14  The Illinois,'5
Texas, 1 and California"' acts also expressly provide that the local act is to
the Maine act. Saunder's Case, 126 Me. 144, 136 AtI. 722 (1927).' Compensation has
been granted under the Maine act where the injury, resulting in death, of a non-resident
occurred in Maine, but the contract of employment was made outside the state. Smith
v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 119 Me. 552, 112 Atl. 516 (1921).
"LVERONT GENERAL LAWS (1917), § 5770, now VT. PUB LAws (1934) § 6506.
12286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 82 A. L. R. 696 (1932).
13 VERMONT GENERAL LAWS (1917) §§ 5774, 5765, 5763, now VT. PuB. LAWS (1934)
§§ 6510, 6499, 6498.
14The court pointed out, however, that this statutory relationship and obligation to
which the employer and employee subjected themselves under the Vermont act, and
which was a 'defense in the New Hampshire court, does not give the Vermont act an
extra-territorial application, as it was simply an application of the general rule of
Conflicts of Laws that the law of the place where the contract is made governs.15 ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 48, § 142; Beall Bros. Supply Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 341 Ill. 193, 173 N. E. 64 (1930) ; Kennedy-Van Saun Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 355 Ill. 519, 189 N. E. 916, (1934) ; In Cole v. Industrial Com-
mission, 353 Ill. 415, 187 N. E. 520, 90 A. L. R. 119 (1933), compensation was allowed
under the Illinois act where the injury occurred in Illinois, but the contract of employ-
ment was made in Indiana. The court acknowledged the Indiana employment but refused
to enforce the Indiana compensation act as it was not bound to do so under the full
faith and credit clause. Quaere as to the effect of this case in the light of Miller v.
Yellow Cab Co., 308 Ill. App. 217, 31 N. E. (2d) 406 (1941), where it was held that
the public policy of Illinois as expressed in the Illinois compensation act is not opposed
to the maintenance of an action by an employee hired, residink and employed in Texas,
to recover damages from a person other than his employer for injuries sustained in
Illinois in the scope of his employment, when the Texas compensation law gave the
employee such right of action.
16 TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1941) art. 8306, § 19; Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co. v. Dixon, 145 S. W. (2d) 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). An employee hired
in Texas and injured outside the state may sue to enforce his claim to compensation
under the statute in any court of competent jurisdiction within the state, provided the
injury occurs within one year from the date the injured employee left the state. No
recovery can be had by the employee under the statute if he has elected to pursue his
remedy and recovers in the courts of the state where the injury occurred. Fidelity and
Casualty Co. v. McLaughlin, 134 Tex. 613, 135 S. W. (2d) 955 (1940).
1 7 CAL. LAaoR CoDE (Deering, 1937) § 505; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acci-
dent Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920) ; Alaska Packers' Association v.
Industrial Accident Commission, 1 Cal. (2d) 250, 34 P. (2d) 716 (1934); Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 158,
97 P. (2d) 267 (1939); Globe Cotton Oil Mills v. Industrial Accident Commission,
64 Cal. App. 307, 221 Pac. 658 (1933).
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govern in compensating injuries occurring outside the state in the course
of an employment contracted for within the state. Under the Illinois and
California statutes, the making of the contract of employment within the
state subjects the parties to the state compensation law, even though the em-
ployment is to be performed exclusively without the state. This differs from
the general New York view that its act does not apply unless a substantial
portion of the work takes place in New York.' s The New York cases, how-
ever, which apply the local act when non-hazardous employment outside the
state is contracted for within New York, accord with the provisions of these
statutes.19 The Texas statutory provision for the extra-territorial effect of
its act, along with the provisions of the Massachusetts, Maine, and Vermont
acts, has been interpreted according to the general New York rule that the
out-of-state employment must be incidental to the principal employment with-
in the state before the local act is applicable.2 0
Alaska Packers' Association v. Industrial Accident Cominissioni- raised
the question: If the parties contract for coverage under the act of the state
of performance and such contract is made within a state giving its own
compensation act extra-territorial effect, what law will govern? In this case,
an employee was hired in California to work in Alaska. The contract was
expressly made subject to the Alaska compensation act. The employee was
injured in Aalaska, but returned to California, where his wages were to
be paid, and there brought suit. The United States Supreme Court held
that the stipulation for coverage under the Alaska act was void, since the
California compensation act was exclusive as to contracts made in Cali-
fornia. From this, it would seem to follow that the states with extra-terri-
torial provisions in their statutes have exclusive jurisdiction over contracts
made within the state. But this is not true where the employee elects to sue
under the act of the state where the injury occurs., In such a suit, the court
of the situs of the injury'may apply the local act. In Pacific Employers'
Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,2 2 it was held that the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution does not preclude California from
applying its own compensation act in the case of an injury suffered by an
employee from Massachusetts while he was in California, temporarily em-
ployed there on the business of his master, although the compensation act
of Massachusetts, the state of contracting, was extra-territorial in effect. In
light of this case, it seems that the employee could sue to recover under the
act of the state where the injury occurred in spite of the fact that the law
of the state of contracting provided that its compensation act would apply.2
18Post v. Burger and Gohlke, supra, note 2.
19Wagoner v. Brown Manufacturing Co., supra, note 4.
20Post v. Burger and Gohike, supra, note 2; Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. McLaughlin,
supra, note 16; Wright's Case, supra, note 9; Saunder's Case, supra, note 10; Bradford
v. Clapper, supra, note 12.
21294 U. S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518 (1934).
22306 U. S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629 (1938).
23See also Griffen v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 Sup. Ct. 1023 (1941). Bradford
v. Clapper, supra note 12, can be distinguished on the grounds that there was nothing
in the New Hampshire statute or decisions or the circumstances of the case, to suggest
that reliance on the provisions of the Vermont statute, as a defense to the New Hamp-
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This employee's option seems to apply also to contracts made in states simi-
lar to New York and New Jersey, where there is no express extra-terri-
torial provision in the compensation act. It has been recognized that the
Ohio workmen's compensation act2 has extra-territorial application where
the out-of-state employment in which the injury occurred is incidental to the
Ohio .employment.25 The Ohio law, like that of New York, has been held
not to apply where no part of the employment contract is to be performed
in Ohio.26
Allowing the employee to be compensated under the statute of the state
where the employment contract was made, even though the injury was re-
ceived in another jurisdiction, appears to be the almost universal rule. To
make the system of workmen's compensation as effective as possible, the
employee or his representative should be allowed to enforce his claim in
the state most convenient to him, where an important link in the chain of
facts takes place. In most cases, this will be the state where the contract
of hiring was made. Otherwise, if the circumstances of employment under
which the injury occurred are similar to those in the Lepow case 2 7 the
claimant would be practically without a remedy. The principal case has
gone further than any other decision in protecting the New York employee
injured in the course of his employment outside the state. But the result
is a desirable one; it is in accord with the basic New York policy of com-
pensating workmen and their representatives for injury or death as a price
of modern business and industry.
William T. Cronin*
Criminal Law: Effect of pardon under habitual criminal statute.--
Where the defendant, convicted in New York of robbery in the third degree,
previously had been convicted of a bank robbery in a Federal court, his
sentence as a second offender' was upheld in People ex rel. Prisament v.
shire suit, was obnoxious to the policy of New Hampshire. If the Vermont statute
seriously violated New Hampshire policy, that state would not be required to give full
faith and credit to the Vermont law.2 4OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) §§ 1465-61, 1465-68.
2 Iall v. Industrial Commission, 131 Ohio St. 416, 3 N. E. (2d) 367 (1936) ; Klump
v. Industrial Commission, 65 Ohio App. 270, 29 N. E, (2d) 627 (1940); Druell v.
Industrial Commission, 65 Ohio App. 203, 29 N. E. (2d) 883 (1940) ; Industrial Com-
mission v. Ware, 10 Ohio App. 375, 121 N. E. 903 (1919).2 6lndustrial Commission v. Gardinio, 119 Ohio St. 539, 164 N. E. 758 (1929) ; Rockey
v. Armour Fertilizer Works, Inc., 64 Ohio App. 497, 28 N. E. (2d) 1009 (1940).27288 N. Y. 377, 43 N. E. (2d) 450 (1942).
*Third-year student, not a member of the QUARTERLY staff.
'N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1941. "A person, who, after having been once or twice convicted
within this state, of a felony, . . . , or, under the laws of any other state, government,
or country, of a crime which, if committed within this state, would be a felony, com-
mits any felony, within this state, is punishable upon conviction of such second or third
offense, as follows: If the second or third felony is such that, upon a first conviction,
the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural
life, then such person must be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate sentence
the minimum of which shall be not less than the longest term prescribed upon a first
conviction and the maximum of which shall be twice such term. * * *"
N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 470-b provides: ". . . (1) For the purpose of indictment
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Brophy, 287 N. Y. 132, 38 N. E. (2d) 468 (1941), notwithstanding the
fact that after his former sentence the defendant had received from the Presi-
dent of the United States a full and unconditional pardon2 based on his
innocence. 3
"All in all, the law of pardon has been a neglected orphan .... it presents
a somewhat disorderly spectacle and has picked up certain unfortunate at-
tributes."14 One of its most unfortunate attributes is reflected in the principal
case-a man, on the ground of in-nocence, may be pardoned for a crime for
which he has been convicted, and yet upon a single later conviction he may be
sentenced as a second offender.
Much of the conflicting decisions and dicta concerning pardons may be
traced to the early case of Ex parte Garland,5 in which it was held that a
pardon "blots out the existence of the guilt" of the accused and makes him
a "new man." The same and other courts subsequently insisted that there
is a "confession of guilt implied by the acceptance of a pardon."' 7 The com-
bination of these views presents a paradox-there is a confession of guilt in
accepting a pardon although it makes the recipient "as innocent as if he had
never committed the offence.""
The failure to distinguish the two distinct grounds for pardons and their
wholly different effects has accounted for much of the above disorder. It is
undoubted that the majority of pardons are "acts of grace", 9 proceeding from
the authority of the executive to grant clemency because of good behavior,
unusual deeds, acting as state's witnes,, and similar considerations. Such
pardons act prospectively and absolve from all further punishment or other
direct legal consequences of conviction.' 0 But such pardons cannot wipe out
the established fact that the person was guilty of the offense," nor can such
and conviction of a second offense, the plea or verdict and suspension of execution of
the whole or a part of the judgment after sentence shall be regarded as a conviction,
and shall be pleaded according to the fact."
"U. S. CONsT. ART. II, § 2, cl. 2. "* * * and he [the President] shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases
of Impeachment."
3The Presidential pardon contained the following preamble or recital: "Whereas it
has been made to appear to me that the said Martin Prisament is innocent of the offense
for which he is now being held." (Italics added.)
43 ATr'y GEN'S. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939) p. ix.
54 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1867).
61bid. at 380; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U. S. 92, 103 (1890) ; People
v. Court of Sessions, 141 N. Y. 288, 295, 36 N. E. 386, 388 (1894).7Burdick v. United States, 236 U. S. 79, 91, 35 Sup. Ct. 267, 269 (1915) ; Roberts v.
State, 160 N. Y. 217, 221, 54 N. E. 678, 679 (1899) ; Baldi v. Gilchrist, 204 App. Div.
425, 427-8, 198 N. Y. Supp. 493, 495 (1st Dep't 1923).
sEx parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (U. S. 1867); State v. Baptiste, 26 La. Ann.
134 (1874).
DUnited States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 159, 160 8 L. ed. 640 (1833). Mr. Justice Field
stated in the case of Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 149, 153 (1877) : "A pardon is
an act of grace by which an offender is released from the consequence of his offense.
... It releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the offense, and restores
him to all civil rights. .. ."101n re Spenser, 5 Sawy. 195, 22 Fed. Cas. 921 (C. C. D. Ore. 1878).
"in re Attorney, 86 N. Y. 563 (1881) ; Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?
(1915) 28 HARv. L. REV. 645.
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pardons restore offices forfeited,'" costs and fines paid, and other interests
which have become vested as a result of the conviction. 13 Where good moral
character is made a prerequisite to a license, such a pardon will not prevent
revocation or refusal of such license.14 Rules governing naturalization 15 and
immigration 16 are similar.
On the other hand, pardons granted on the basis of innocence properly
should be held to relieve from guilt as well as from punishment.17 The force
of the argument can hardly be denied that a pardon based on innocence
should have the effect of wiping out any and all traces of guilt. To pardon
a man for innocence is ironic, to say the least.' 8  Although no case has
squarely held this proposition, a few judicial intimations are to be found 9
and several authors have pointed out forcibly this differentiation.,O In addi-
tion, analogies may be found in instances where a reversal of conviction2 '
or a mistaken conviction 22 have been held to relieve a person from subsequent
punishment as a second offender, or otherwise.
There is a clear split of authority as to whether a pardoned offense may
be counted in applying statutes providing for increased punishment for a
12Commonwealth v. Fugate, 2 Leigh 724 (Va. 1830); State v. Carson, 27 Ark. 469
(1872) ; State ex rel. Webb v. Parks, 122 Tenn. 230, 122 S. W. 977 (1909).
13Knote v. United States, .upra note 9; In re Stephenson, - Ala. -, 10 So. (2d)
1 (1942) ; 3 AnT'Y GEN'S. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939) 278 and cases there
cited.
'4In re Attorney, 86 N. Y. 563 (1881)- (disbarment) ; Baldi v. Gilchrist, 204 App. Div.
425, 198 N. Y. Supp. 493 (1st Dep't 1923) (taxi license) ; People ex rel. Deneen v.
Gilmore, 214 Ill. 569, 72 N. E. 737 (1905) (disbarment) ; State v. Hazzard, 139 Wash.
487, 247 Pac. 957 (1926) (license for practicing healing art); OP'N ATr'Y GEN. Wis.
(1933) 942 (medical license).15In re Spenser, 5 Sawy. 195, 199, 22 Fed. Cas. 921, 922 (C. C. D. Ore. 1878).
'
6 United States ex rel. Palermo v. Smith, 17 F. (2d) ' 603 (1927) ; Weedin v. Hempel,
28 F. (2d) 603 (1928).
173 ATT'Y GEN'S. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939) 270.
ISId. at 296.
19Groseclose'v. Plummer et al., 106 F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 9th 1939), cert. denied, 3,08
U. S. 614, 60 Sup. Ct. 264 (1939) ; People v. Dutton, 9 Cal. (2d) 505, 71 P. (2d) 218
(1937); People v. Briggs, 9 Cal. (2d) 508, 71 P. (2d) 214 (1937). The concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Laughlin in People v. Carlesi, 154 App. Div. 481, 139 N. Y. Supp.
309 (1st Dep't 1913), aff'd on opinion below, 208 N. Y. 547, 101 N. E. 1114 (1913),
aff'd sub iwrm. Carlesi v. People, 233 U. S. 51, 34 Sup. Ct. 576 (1914), stated the fol-
lowing: "I am of opinion that if the defendant had received a full and unlimited pardon
for the former offense it would have constituted an invulnerable shield against a subse-
quent conviction for a felony as a 'second offense,' pursuant to the provisions of section
1941 of the Penal Law, which requires a longer sentence in. such cases; because that
statute presupposes not merely a former formal conviction, which may have been vacated
or reversed, but which stands unaffected, whereas such a pardon obliterates guilt and is
equivalent to a verdict of not guilty.... [citing authorities]."
203 ATT'y GEN'S. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939) 270 et seq.; Weihofen,, The
Effect of a Pardon (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 177; Weihofen, Pardon: An Extraordi-
nary Remedy (1940)) 12 RocKY MT. L. REV. 112; Notes (1942) 139 A. L. R 673;
(1942) 11 BROOKLYN L. REV. 223; (1929) 14 MINN. L. REv. 293; (1928) ; 41 HARv. L.
.REv. 918; (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 699.21People ex rel. Goldstein v. Clancy, 163 App. Div. 614, 148 N. Y. Supp. 977 (2d
Dep't 1914).22Matter of Kaufman, 245 N. Y. 423, 157 N. E. 730 (1927).
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second or subsequent conviction. Indiana,23 Louisiana,24 Ohio, 25 and Vir-
ginia20 hold that the prior offense may not be counted if a pardon has inter-
vened, while a contrary view is supported in New York,27 Kentucky,2s ,
Minnesota,29 Texas,30 and Washington. 31  For the ordinary pardon, not
granted on the basis of innocence, it appears to be the better rule that a prior
conviction for which a pardon has been granted is, nevertheless, a prior
conviction within the meaning of a statute enhancing punishment for second
and subsequent offenses.&3 2 Clearly this is so where character is involved or
the factum of the crime is important.
The dissenting opinion of the Appellate Division (Fourth Department) in
the principal case, seemingly approved in the majority opiniion of the Court
of Appeals, suggests'three modes of relief for the prisoner: (1) executive
clemency by the governor, (2) remedial legislation, and (3) application to
the Federal trial court for setting aside its verdict on the ground of in-
justice. Upon examination, no one of these suggestions is adequate for the
obvious injury done to an inhocent man in a case such as this. Clemency by
the governor is uncertain and circuitous, depending upon many factors not
pertinent to a particular individual. Remedial legislation may be the answer
to the problem in long-range planning, as will hereinafter appear, but is an
onerous and impossible burden to place upon an individual defendant.3 3 An
application for setting aside the verdict could not be made in this case be-
,cause of a technicality,3 4 and because of the ending of the term in which
the verdict had been reached and sentence imposed.3 5 An impass6 is thus
reached-the court refuses to act without legislation and the legislature does
not act. Meanwhile, this and other defendants may be subjected to longer
terms of imprisonment on indefensible grounds.
23Kelly v. State, 204 Ind. 612, 185 N. E. 453 (1933).
2 4State v. Lee, 171 La. 744, 132 So. 219 (1931).25 State v. Martin, 59 Ohio St. 212, 52 N. E. 188, 42 A. L. R. 98 (1898) ; State v.
Anderson, 7 Ohio N. P. 562 (1896).2 6Edwards v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 39, 49 Am. Rep. 377 (1883).27 People v. Carlesi, supra note 19; People ex rel. Malstrom v. Kaiser, 135 Misc. 67,
236 N. Y. Supp. 619 (1929) ; People v. McIntyre, 99 Misc. 17, 163 N. Y. Supp. 528 (1917).
28Herndon v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 197, 48 S. W. 989 (1899) ; Mound v. Common-
wealth, 2 Duv. 93 (Ky. 1865).2 0 State v. Stern, 210 Minn. 107, 297 N. W. 321 (1941).
3 0Jones v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. Rep. 70 147 S W. (2d) 508 (1941), overrulhig
Scrivnor v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. Rep. 194, 26 S. W. (2d) 416 (1928).
SIState v. Edelstein, 146 Wash. 221, 262 Pac. 622 (1927).
32(1942) 139 A. L. R. 673.
3 3 Relator-Respondent's Brief, p. 11, states that the suggestion of remedial legislation
in this case "places an unusual burden upon the prisoner, who, it seems, ought to find
a remedy in the existing law for every wrong, under our constitutional government"3 4 Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 699, 702. Because the relator, at the time of his arrest,
was in possession of firearms, ammunition, and other equipment commonly used in
bank robberies, and stolen automobile plates, he was not able to recite that he did not
contribute to his arrest "either intentionally, or by wilful misconduct, or negligence."
58 STAT. 428, § 2(c) (1938), 18 U. S. C. § 730(c) (1940).
S5 In the United States new trials are permitted without the aid of statute, providing
the order is made before the end of the term. Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 175
(1895). However, only under exceptional circumstances is there any way by which
newly discovered evidence proving a person's innocence can be made available after
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The injustice of the principal case points to the need for a liberalized crimi-
nal procedure which will permit reversal of a conviction where new evidence
is found indicating that the defendant was innocent of the crime charged.36
Precedent exists in continental law for judicial reconsideration of such cases 3 7
Although it is argued that judgments must be certain, generally free from
attack, and the courts should not be kept open indefinitely for reconsidera-
tion of cases, the few number of cases in which innocence can be claimed
or established subsequent to a conviction and the rank injustice promoted
if such a remedy is not available should convince the most conservative of
its desirability. Until and unless the criminal procedure is so liberalized as
to allow judicial review when newly discovered evidence shows that the
wrong man has been convicted, reliance must be placed upon the pardoning
power and the courts should not be reluctant to give full effect to an execu-
tive pardon based on innocence without statutory help.38
The argument that giving judicial effect to an executive pardon impinges
upon the doctrine of the separation of governmental power and functions has
not prevented Congress from giving the executive such power in specified
instances,39 nor has the Court of Appeals been adamant in its stand adopted
in the principal case.
4 0
At least one state has, by statute, provided that a previous conviction will
not be considered if a pardon therefor has been granted "for the reason that
he was innocent." 41 Other states provide compensation for persons errone-
the term has expired in which the judgment against him was given, except by pardon.
United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 35 Sup. Ct. 16 (1914); Appo v. People, 20
N. Y. 531 (1860).
363 ATT'y GEN'S. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939) 296. The principal case
recognizes the need for corrective legislation to cover a case of this type. The opinion
states: "Under an ideal system of administration of justice a person convicted of a
crime should, perhaps, be granted an opportunity to present to a court proof of his
innocence whenever such proof becomes available and, then, to ask the court to vacate
the erroneous judgment. In practice, inflexible rules of procedure may deny to a
person wrongfully convicted any further access to the court." 287 N. Y. at 139, 38
N. E. (2d) at 471.37Weihofen, Pardon: An Extraordinary Remedy (1940) 12 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 112,
118.
383 ATT'y GEN'S. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939) 294.
3952 STAT. 438 (1938), 18 U. S. C. §§ 729, 730 (Supp. 1942). This statute gives power
to the President to pardon on the basis of innocence. Such a pardon has the same
effect as a judicial reopening of the conviction and a dismissal of the indictment.4 0Matter of Kaufman, 245 N. Y. 423, 157 N. E. 730 (1927). This case involved appli-
cations for reinstatement as attorneys by persons convicted of conspiracy and sentenced
to imprisonment for one year and one day. A commutation of sentence to one month
was granted by the President. Later, the President gave a full and unconditional
pardon in accordance with the recommendation of his Attorney-General who expressed
a belief that the petitioners were innocent. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Cardozo, indicated its unwillingness to be bound unalterably by the rule disbarring an
attorney despite a subsequent Presidential pardon based on innocence. Said the court
at p. 429: "A pardon may in some conditions be a warning as significant as a judgment
of reversal that looms of law have woven a fabric of injustice." The applications were
remitted to the Appellate Division for further inquiry as to the justice of the judgment
of conviction.4 1 IowA CODE (1939) § 13402.
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ously convicted.42 If the courts continue to act without statutory guidance or
authority the need for legislation in this field is urgent.
Tozier Brown
Habeas Corpus: Scope of review: Jurisdiction of trial court. -In People
ex rel. Carr v. Martin, 286 N. Y. 27, 35 N. E. (2d) 636 (1941), the Court of
Appeals refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus to the defendant, who had
been convicted on his plea of guilty to the charge of second degree larceny.
In his petition, the defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court
because the indictment failed to show acts which constituted a crime in that
the property stolen was the joint property of petitioner and the complainant,
his wife, and that he could not steal from himself. The Appellate Division
had overruled the lower court's denial of the writ and had granted it on the
ground that a husband may not be convicted of larceny from his wife.'
The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Appellate Division, in the
habeas corpus proceedings, had wrongfully decided questions of law and fact
which were within the jurisdiction of the trial court but which had not been
raised there.
The writ of habeas corpus, one of the oldest of the English prerogative
writs, has been in use for centuries as a remedial device by those who have
been illegally deprived of their liberty.2 That it may not be used to perform
the functions of an appeal or writ of error is a virtual legal maxim. 3 As in
the case of all such maxims, however, simplicity of statement is accompanied
by difficulty of application.
Habeas corpus is in the nature of a civil suit or proceeding separate and
distinct from the criminal prosecution it seeks to remedy.4  When used to
obtain the release of a prisoner under custody by virtue of a final judgment
of an inferior court, it becomes a method of.collateral attack.5 Judgments
4 2 Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice (1941) 21 B. U. L.
REv. 201.
'261 App. Div. 865, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 729 (3d Dep't 1941).2 United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 47
Sup. Ct. 302 (1926), following the decision in Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8,
28 Sup. Ct. 201 (1907) (writ granted to a Chinese person held under restraint on board
ship after an improper hearing by immigration officials) ; Rase v. United States, 129 F.(2d) 204 (C. C. A. 6th 1942). 1 BAILEY, HABEAS CORPUS (1913) § 2; 2 SPELLING,
EXTRAORDINARY RELIE (1893) § 1152. For a discussion of federal court jurisdiction
over habeas corpus, see In re Burris, 136 U. S. 586, 10 Sup. Ct. 850 (1890).3Ashe v. United States, 270 U. S. 424, 46 Sup. Ct. 333 (1926) ; Collins v. Johnston,
Warden of California State Prison, 237 U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 649 (1915) ; Ex parte
Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 23 L. ed. 787 (1876) ; People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y.
559 (1875), reversing 3 Hun 760 (1875). The writ may be used in conjunctoin with
the writ of certiorari as a proceeding to correct errors. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S.
564, 5 Sup. Ct. 1050 (1884).4Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U. S. 333, 43 Sup. Ct. 555 (1923) ; Ex parte Tom Tong, 108,
U. S. 556, 28 Sup. Ct. 871 (1883) ; In re Tremper, 126 N. J. Eq. 276, 8 A. (2d) 279
(1939), aff'd, 129 N. J. Eq. 274, 19 A. (2d) 342 (1941) ; People ex rel. Curtis v. Kid-
ney, 225 N. Y. 299, 122 N. E. 241 (1919).5United States, ex -el. Kennedy et al. v. Tyler, Sheriff, et aL, 269 U. S. 13, 46 Sup. Ct.
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may thus be attacked collaterally only when it appears that the inferior court
was without jurisdiction either of the subject matter or of the person.6
Such a judgment is a nullity-void db initio and totally ineffective as a basis
for the enforcement of any rights.7 Discharge of a prisoner sentenced under
it is one of the primary functions of the writ of habeas corpus. .
The converse is equally well-established. Errors in the indictment and
irregularities in the proceedings do not effect the jurisdiction of 'the lower
court if it be otherwise free from attack." A judgment rendered on the
strength of such an indictment and procedure might be flagrantly erroneous,
and voidable at the election of the aggrieved party, but the proper remedy is
by an appeal, or by writ of error where the common law practice has not been
changed by statute.9
The distinction between jurisdictional nd non-jurisdictional defects in
the judgment seems to be the principal issue before the courts in habeas
corpus proceedings. The decision upon this question, as in the principal
case, usually determines whether the writ will be granted or refused.
Federal courts are reluctant to grant the writ where the petitioner attacks
the sufficiency of the indictment on the ground either that it fails to state
a crime' or that it fails to state a crime Qver which the court has jurisdic-
tion."- Exceptions to this rule exist, but they consist of cases involving
1 (1925); Goto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393, 401, 44 Sup. Ct. 525, 527 (1924); In re
Frederich, 149 U. S. 70, 13 Sup. Ct. 793 (1893) ; State ex rel. Dunlap v. Utecht, 206
Minn. 401, 287 N. W. 229 (1939).
6McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23, 19 L. ed. 545 (U. S. 1863). 1 BLACK, JUDGMENTS
(2d ed. 1902) §§ 245, 246 and cases cited therein.7People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559, 568 (1875). 1 BLACK, op. cit. supra
note 6, § 278.8People ex rel. Childs v. Knott, 228 N. Y. 608, 127 N. E. 329 (1920), affirming 187
App. Div. 604, 176 N. Y. Supp. 321 (1st Dep't 1918) ; People ex rel. Farrington v. Men-
sching, 187 N. Y. 8, 79 N. E. 884 (1907). HURD, HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. 1876) §§ 332,
333.
The indictment may, however, be so defective as to preclude any court from gettingjurisdiction over the subject matter. In such a case review on a writ of habeas corpus
is proper. For a general discussion of this point see Note (1928) 57 A.L.R. 85.9Garrison v. Hudspeth, 108 F. (2d) 733 (C.C.A. 10th 1939) ; Bostic v. Rives, 107 F.(2d) 649" (App. D. C. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 664, 60 Sup. Ct. 593 (1939);
McRell v. Kelley, 124 N. J. Eq. 350, 1 A. (2d) 926 (1938), affirming per curiam, In re
Kelly et al., 123 N. J. Eq. 489, 198 Atl. 203 (1938) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Aikens v.
Ashe, 137 Pa. Super. 392, 9 A. (2d) 201 (1940) ; cf. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19,
59 Sup. Ct.-442 (1939).
'9Goto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393, 44 Sup. Ct. 525 (1924), where Mr. Justice Van De-
vanter said at p. 402, 527: "If it [the court] erred in determining them, [facts in the
indictment] its judgment was not for that reason void, [citing cases] but subject to cor-
rection in regular course on writ of error .... And, if the petitioner permitted the time
within which a review on a writ of error might be obtained to elapse and thereby lost
the opportunity for such a review, that gave no right to resort to habeas corpus as a
substitute." Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. 152 (1883).
lChaprales v. W. I. Biddle, Warden, 268 U. S. 682, 45 Sup. Ct. 640 (1924) ; Knight v.
Hudspeth, 112 F. (2d) 137, 139 (C.C.A. 10th 1940) ; Dellari v. W. I. Biddle, 5 F. (2d)
21 (C.C.A. 8th 1925) where the court said at p. 21: "The construction to be put on
the indictment and its sufficiency were matters which rested primarily with the court
that tried the petitioner."
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federal questions, conflicts between state and federal jurisdiction, treaty rights,
and sentences in excess of jurisdiction.12
Closely allied with defects in the judgment and helpffil in analysing the
premises upon which many courts either grant or refuse the writ is the
judicial attitude with regard to habeas corpus review of sentences imposed
by lower courts. The same jurisdictional considerations influence most
courts. Usually the imposition of a sefitence in excess of that prescribed by
statute is not considered a jurisdictional defect warranting the use of habeas
corpus.13 When the prisoner has served the portion of his sentence valid
under the statute he may be relieved of the excess by use of the writ.1 4  If
the sentence is not merely excessive in duration but is one wholly unauthor-
ized and different from that contemplated by law, the defect is held to be
jurisdictional. 15 There is also authority for a more refined distinction which
ignores the void aspect of the sentence. As long as the conviction is valid,
the prisoner will not be discharged absolutely but will be remanded for a
proper sentence.' 6
It is difficult to formulate any definite standards which courts have followed
in determining whether a judgment is void or voidable.' 7 General proposi-
tions can serve as guides only if aided by a consideration of circumstances
which courts have deemed sufficient to justify the use of the writ, and of the
extent to which they will inquire into those circumstances. Federal and
state courts require that the court rendering the judgment being questioned
must have had authority also to render that type of judgment-"a jurisdic-
tion of that class of offences.""' In the leading case of Ex parte Yar-
12Lamar v. United States, 241 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 255 (1916) ; Henry v. Henkel,
235 U. S. 219, 35 Sup. Ct. 54 (1914); Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, 35 Sup. Ct. 137
(1914) ; Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S. 245, 33 Sup. Ct. 240 (1913); Riggins v. United
States, 199 U. S. 547, 26 Sup. Ct. 141 (1905).
13Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U: S. 442, 31 Sup. Ct. 44 (1910); United States v.
Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48, 62, 14 Sup. Ct. 746 (1894) ; McKee v. Johnston, 109 F. (2d)
273 (C.C.A. 9th 1939); cf. People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 550 (1875).
For a discussion of the holdings in various state courts see 1 BAILEY, op. Cit. supra note
2, § 54.
141n re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176, 9 Sup. Ct. 672 (1888) ; In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274, 7
Sup. Ct. 556 (1887) ; Ex parte Erdmann, 88 Cal. 579, 26 Pac. 372 (1891) ; People ex rel.
,Tweed v. Liscomb, supra note 13; but see People ex rel. Bretton v. Schleth, 68 Misc.
307, 123 N. Y. Supp. 686 (1910) (writ refused because the defective sentence did not
affect jurisdiction of the trial court to render the judgment).
'SHill v. Wampler, 298 U. S. 460, 56 Sup. Ct. 760 (1936) ; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S.
417, 5 Sup. Ct. 935 (1884) ; People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, supra note 13.
16State ex reL. Martin v. Gunter, 16 Ala. App. 293, 77 So. 443 (1917) ; In re Fritz,
179 Cal. 415, 177 Pac. 157 (1918) ; Littlejohn v. Stells, 123 Ga. 427, 51 S. E. 390 (1905) ;
State ex rel. Cutrer v. Pitcher, 164 La. 1051, 115 So. 187 (1927) ; Commonwealth ex rel.
Guiramez v. Ashe, 293 Pa. 18, 141 Atl. 723 (1928) (void sentences in lower courtsjustified released under them but the court ordered prisoner remanded for a proper sen-
tence thus obviating necessity for new trial). See also an early Wisconsin case, In re
Crandall, 34 Wis. 177 (1877). Contra: Elliot v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 333 (U. S. 1828)
Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (U. S. 1873).
'
7For a lengthy discussion of the problem see In re Peirce, 44 Wis. 411 (1878) (with
a dissent by Mr. Justice Ryan). 1 BAILEY, JURISDIcrMON (1899) § 25; 1 BLACE, op. Cit.
sura note 6, §§ 258, 259.
ISh& re Coy, 127 U. S. 731, 8 Sup. Ct. 1263 (1887) ; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417,
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brough,19 the court refused to grant a writ and held that it was within the
province of the trial court to ascertain whether or not the particular indict-
ment set forth an act which the statute described and made criminal.
But more recent cases in the federal courts indicate that those tribunals
have considerably enlarged the scope of their inquiry under habeas corpus
and will go beyond the record to ascertain the question of jurisdiction.2 0
Pennsylvania decisions show that the courts in that state will review, on
habeas corpus, judgments and sentences which are merely erroneous though
not void.21  California courts have applied a quasi-estoppel doctrine in cer-
tain instances to justify denial of the writ where circumstances would other-
wise seem to have warranted its issuance.22
In a recent New Jersey opinion, the Court of Chancery showed no such
solicitude for a liberal use of the writ which other state and federal courts
have evinced. After declaring that the petitioner bears the burden of show-
ing why the writ should issue, the court in an elaborate opinion concluded
that the petition presented no grounds warranting its further consideration
by the court. The jurisdictional problems were thus evaded.23
That the writ of habeas corpus has become an increasingly more flexible
and popular instrument to secure appellate review of judgments is quite ap-
5 Sup. Ct. 935 (1884) ; In re Kaster, 52 Cal. App. 454, 198 Pac. 1029. (1921) ; Ex parte
Kearny, 55 Cal. 212 (1880) ; In re Paschal, 56 Kan. 123, 42 Pac. 373 (1895) ; People
ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, supra note 13.
IOSupra note 10.
20Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1938) ; Frank v. Magnum, 237
U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582 (1915). The Court said at p. 327, 587: "But it would be
clearly erroneous to confine the inquiry to the proceedings and judgment of the trial
court." In In re Mayfield, 141 U. S. 107, 11 Sup. Ct. 939 (1891), the Court stated at
p. 116, 949: ". .. it [the petitioned court] has power to inquire with regard to the
jurisdiction of the inferior court, either in respect to the subject matter or to the
person even if such inquiry . . . involves an examination of facts outside of, but not in-
consistent with the record." As to the effect of a court's decision upon its own juris-
diction see Hine v. Morse, 218 U. S. 493, 31 Sup. Ct. 37 (1910). See also 1 BLACK,
op. cit. supra note 6, § 274.2 1 Commonvealth ex rel Schultz v. Smith,- Warden, 139 Pa. Super. 357, 11 A. (2d)
656 (1939). But cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Curtis v. Ashe, 139 Pa. Super. 417, 12 A.
(2d) 500 (1941).
Both the Schultz and Curtis cases dealt with the writ of habeas corpus and its appli-.
cation where the petitioners alleged deprivation in violation of a constitutional right.
The writ was granted in the Schultz case.
Two years later in a similar case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the writ
and by implication overruled the Schultz case. The opinion by Mr. justice Maxey
presents an excellent analysis of federal court and Pennsylvania decisions. Common-
wealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 14, 24 A. (2d) 1 (1942).
In Commonwealth ex rel Shaw v. Smith, 147 Pa. Super. 423, 24 A. (2d) 724 (1942),
President Judge Keller conceded that his opinion in the Schultz case had been overruled
by the McGlihu case.
But the general doctrine that fundamental and basic errors may be corrected on
habeas corpus is still adhered to in Pennsylvania. Commonwealth ex rel Aldrich v.
Ashe, 148 Pa. Super. -, 26 A. (2d) 211 (1942).
22I1; re Connor, 16 Cal. (2d) 701, 108 P. (2d) 10 (1940) ; Ex parte Maldonado, 97
Cal. App. 288, 275 Pac. 495 (1929).2 31n re Tremper, 126 N. J. Eq. 276, 8 A. (2d) 279 (1939), aff'd, 129 N. J. Eq. 274,
19 A. (2d) 342 (1941).
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parent. There are arguments of social import and judicial expediency both
for and against a more liberal policy with regard to the granting of the writ.
The distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional defects in judg-
ments sought to be reviewed is still, it is submitted, a sound basis for decision.
As long as the courts adhere to such a distinction, as in the principal case,
the growing tendency to grant the writ as a corrective device will, at least,
be temporarily checked.2 4
John S. De Jose
Quasi-Contracts: Theory of statutory liability of stockholders.-Pufahl v
Parks Estate, 299 U. S. 217, 57 Sup. Ct. 151 (1936) raises with renewed
significance the question of the nature of. the liability imposed by statute'
upon stockholders for the contracts, debts, and obligations of an insolvent
bank. The diverse decisions involving this statutory liability have been
rationalized on the basis of three theories producing not wholly consistent
results. This liability has been characterized as: (a) contractual, (b)
quasi-trust, and (c) quasi-contractual.
The statutory liability of a stockholder has often been held to be contrac-
tual because the obligation is engendered by and relates to the subscription
contract,2 forming an essential element of the contract voluntarily entered
into.3 According to the cases which adopt this theory, the statute is read
into and becomes a part of every stockholder's contract.4 The stockholder
truly contracts for a personal liability according to the tenor of the statute.5
To say that the statute is read into the contract and becomes a part of
the voluntary undertaking is a vicious fiction, as confusing as it is false. The
statutory liability is a condition imposed by law upon the contracting parties
24For a good discussion of the complexities of present day appellate review and sug-
gested reforms therein see POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CML CASES (1941) c. 6,
pp. 377-393.
138 STAT. 273, 12 U. S. C. § 71 (1913). "The stockholders of every national banking
association shall be held individually responsible for all contracts, debts, and engage-
ments of such association, each to the amount of his stock therein, at the par value
thereof in addition to the amount invested in such stock. The stockholders in any
national banking association who shall have transferred their shares or registered the
transfer thereof within sixty days next before-the date of the failure of such association
to meet its obligations, or with knowledge of such impending failure, shall be liable
to the same extent as if they had made no such transfer to the extent that the subsequent
transferee fails to meet such liability; but this provision shall not be construed to
affect in any way any recourse which such shareholders might otherwise have against
those in whose names such shares are registered at the time of such failure."
N. Y. BANK. LAW § 113 (a). "The stockholders of every bank and every trust com-
pany shall be individually responsible, equally and ratably and not one for another, for
all contracts, ,debts and engagements of the bank or trust company, to the extent of
the amount of their stock therein at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount
invested in such shares."2 Matteson v. Dent, 176 U. S. 521, 20 Sup. Ct. 419 (1900).3 Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788 (1887).4 Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498, 19 L. ed. 476 (1869).
5 Whitman v. Oxford National Bank, 176 U. S. 559, 20 Sup. Ct. 477 (1899).
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rather than an integral part of the terms of an express contract which forms
the agreement between the parties.6 The liability attaches as an incident of
a relationship, purely collateral to the contract.7 Since it is imposed by stat-
ute and does not arise from the express contract of the parties, it cannot
be contracted against; even if it chose to do so, the corporation could not
relieve the stockholder from this statutory liability.8 No disclaimer by the
stockholder would be effective to avoid it.9 Indeed the statutory liability
attaches regardless of the stockholder's knowledge of its existence.10
When the femne covert did not have the legal capacity to contract, still
she was liable for an assessment upon bank stock because the liability was
not based on contract but was purely statutory." The liability imposed by
the statute is not necessarily joint because the enterprise of which it is a
part is joint. The statutory liability is determined not by the law governing
the venture but by the ownership of the stock.' 2 All actions on a stock-
holder's statutory obligation are governed by the statute of limitations which
relates to liability created by statute rather than to liability arising upon
express contract.13 Although the action for breach of contract may not be
barred, the statute of limitations may bar an action to enforce the statutory
liability.14 These cases forcibly expose the fallacy that a stockholder's
statutory liability is either an integral part of his contract of purchase or is
permeated by that mysterious something called the essence of the contract.
It is merely an obligation incident to the ownership of the stock.
The quasi-trust theory appears chiefly in those cases where the record
holder of bank stock has paid an assessment levied against him, although the
levy was made after he sold the stock to the unregistered vendee. Can the
record owner compel the unregistered vendee to indemnify him for having
discharged a statutory obligation which was in fact an incident of ownership?
The courts declare that after the sale of the stock the seller and buyer occupy
a quasi-trust relationship as long as the seller remains actual owner of the
stock.15 Until the transfer of the stock is registered upon the books, the
vendor is still the nominal owner and he is to be regarded as the trustee of
the stock fpr his unregistered vendee. 16 The trust relationship exists as to
each actual owner of the stock only so long as he remains the owner; the
liability is not regarded as contractual but as one of trust.' 7 The courts
6Lewinsohn, Contract Distinguished from Quasi-Contract (1914) 2 CALIF. L. REv. 171.7Chisolm v. Gilman, 298 U. S. 648, 56 Sup. Ct. 682 (1936) ; McClaine v. Rankin, 197
U. S. 154, 25 Sup. Ct. 410 (1904).
SScott c. Latimer, 172 U. S. 649, 19 Sup. Ct. 886 (1898) ; Rawlings v. Meredith, 80
F. (2d) 254 (C. C. A. 5th 1935); McDowell v. Lambe, 21 Tenn. App. 448, 111 S. W.
(2d) 892 (1937).9Browne v. O'Keeffe, 300 U. S. 598, 57 Sup. Ct. 531 (1937).
'OMeeker v. Brewer, 86 F. (2d) 645 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
"lChristopher v. Norwell, 201 U. S. 216, 26 Sup. Ct. 502 (1906).
12Meeker v. Brewer, supra note 10.
'
3McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U. S. 71, 22 Sup. Ct. 290 (1902).
'
4McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 25 Sup. Ct. 410 (1904).
15Broderick v. Aaron, 264 N. Y. 368, 191 N. E. 19, 92 A. L. R. 1422 (1934).
16Johnson v. Underhill, 52 N. Y. 203 (1873).
'
7 Ricbard v. Robin, 175 App. Div. 296, 162 N. Y. Supp. 12 (lst Dep't 1916), aff'd,
225 N. Y. 719, 122 N. E. 899 (1919). But see Brown v. Rosenbaum, 287 N. Y. 510, 41
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label this relationship as quasi-trust merely to obtain a result. To resort
to the concedpt of a trust only confuses the issue. To facilitate the collection
of all assessments upon stock the statute imposes the liability upon the owner
of record. The actual owner of bank stock cannot escape the statutory lia-
bility by mere failure to register it. When the record owner is required to
pay an assessment on stock he has sold he has a quasi-contractual right to
be indemnified by his vendee. It is a simple instance of unjust enrichment.
One who under compulsion discharges an obligation which should have been
discharged by another, is entitled to indemnity.'8
The quasi-contractual character of a statutory obligation which is non-
consensual in origin, is well established. 19 In Pufahl v. Park's Estate °
the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously recognized that fact.
The testator had died owning certain shares of national bank stock. Three
years later, the bank was declared insolvent and the receiver assessed all
stockholders the par value of their stock. The receiver filed his claim against
the estate of Parks for the assessment on the stock held by the deceased.
The point directly in issue related to the assets available for payment of
the assessment under the Illinois non-claim statute. The most significant part
of the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, on appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court, is his apt characterization of the statutory obligation involved.
"The original subscriber and likewise an immediate or remote vendee
of the shares assumes a status-that of stockholder. The assumption of
this status involves whatever conditions or burdens the federal statutes
have imposed as incident to the holding of national bank shares."
21
Unequivocally, justice Roberts indicated the statutory obligation to be mere-
ly an incident of the status which attached to everyone who became owner
of stock in a national bank. A statutory liability was imposed upon a share-
holder in order to safeguard the interest of depositors and creditors. In
event of insolvency of a national bank, the stockholder not only lost the
value of his investment which he acquired by voluntary contract but he was
also liable to the extent of the par value of his stock. The latter liability
was imposed by law. Social policy prescribed the liability as an incident to
his status as owner of bank stock. Clearly this is the valid approach to the
question which has divided the courts whenever the statutory liability of
stockholders has been in issue. The status theory enunciated in the Pufahl
case has promise of acquiring general currency. 22
Even the record of the United States Supreme Court has been far from
N. E. (2d) 77 (1942) distinguishing the wording of the New York Banking statute
and the Federal Banking statute and the application of the quasi-trust theory.1 8 RESTATFmENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 76.
1 9 KEENER, QUAsI-CoNmACTS (1893) 16. "A statutory obligation which does not rest
upon the consent of the parties is clearly quasi-contractual in its nature." Inhabitants
of Ml'ilford v. Commonwealth, 144 Mass. 648 (1887). Lewinsohn, Contract Distinguished
from Quasi-Contract (1914) 3 CALIF. L. Ray. 171.
20299 U. S. 217, 57 Sup. Ct. 151 (1936).
21299 U. S. 217 at 222-3.22Hart v. Burke, 108 F. (2d) 82 (C. C. A. 3d 1939); Smith v. Witherow, 102 F. (2dy
638 (C. C. A. 3d 1939).
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consistent. Coombs v. Getz,23 decided in 1931, involved the nature of lia-
bility, imposed by the constitution of California, on corporate directors to
creditors and stockholders for all money misappropriated by corporate offi-
cers. The creditors of the corporation began an action against the directors
on this constitutional liability. While the suit was pending, the constitu-
tional provision was repealed. The constitution of California also contained
a provision reserving power over corporate laws as follows:
"All laws now in force in this state concerning corporations, and all
laws that may hereafter be passed pursuant to this section, may be
altered from time to time or repealed. '24
The Supreme Court of the United States held this statutory liability to be
a part of the contract between the creditors and the corporation, which was
protected by the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. The confusion
which prevails concerning the question is evidenced by the fact that the
United States Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court by a
vote of six to three.
The luminous dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo is a classical
exposition of the pitfalls which beset judicial thinking when courts expound
the nature of the statutory liability.
"The Supreme Court of California has said that the liability thus cre-
ated is contractual; but only in a qualified sense, as the expression of a
legal fiction, is the statement true, nor did the court that made it intend
otherwise. . . If we put aside deceptive labels, borrowed from the law
of quasi-contracts, the tangle is unraveled. The petitioner had a con-
tract with the corporation and not with anyone else, but annexed by law
to the obligation of that contract was a liability purely statutory imposed
on the directors. . . . In any event, this Court is not controlled by the
label which the state court may affix to a liability growing out of a
given state of facts. It determined for itself whether within the meaning
of the Constitution the product is a contract to be protected by the power
of the nation. As to this, its judgment is guided by realities and not by
words. The section of the Constitution whereby contracts are secured
against impairment is aimed at true agreements, and not at quasi-con-
tracts as distinguished from agreements implied in fact."25
Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. justice Stone joined in Mr. Justice Cardozo's
dissent. Yet Mr. Justice Roberts who wrote the opinion in the Pufahl case
concurred in the majority opinion in the Coombs case. One has difficulty in
reconciling that concurrence with his status theory, which seems so eminently
sound.
Mary Ellen Sproat*
2 3 Coombs v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434, 52 Sup. Ct. 435 (1921).
24285 U. S. at 440.
251d. at 449-50.
*Third-year student, not a member of the QUARTERLY staff.
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Surrogate's Court: Equity jurisdiction: Surviving partner: Account.'-
In In re Kalik's Estate, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 16 (Sufr. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1942),
the executor of a deceased partner cited the surviving partner as a party to
the proceedings before the surrogate to obtain a determination of the dece-
dent's interest in various enterprises in which the decedent had been en-
gaged and the executor requested a decree directing the surviving partner to
account to the estate for the decedent's interest in the firm. Surrogate Foley
granted the surviving partner's motion to strike his name as an improper
party on the ground that the surrogate's court had no jurisdiction to compel
a surviving partner to render an account of the liquidation of the partner-
ship.
Surprisingly enough, the principal case stands on "all fours" with a de-
cision, not cited in the opinion, rendered fifty years ago by the Appellate
Division of the First Department.2 At first glance, the result in the principal
case may appear to be contrary to the long line of liberalizing amendments
which have all tended to expand the jurisdictional limits of the surrogates.3
In 1877, the framers of the Revised Statutes, dealing with the subject of
"Surrogate's Courts and Proceedings Therein," undertook "to adapt the
written law to the actual existing law; where that was settled, to express it
in intelligible language; and to incorporate provisions which should terminate
the uncertainty which now prevails over a large part of the subject . . .4
The results of their efforts were embodied in Section 2472 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, a section which tersely marked out, in seven subdivisions,
a most limited jurisdiction.5 In addition, the Revisers appended a note
'It is the purpose of this note to examine cases involving the jurisdictional border
strife concerning the boundaries of the surrogate's court which is only too frequently
waged by personal representatives of a deceased and his surviving partner.
'In Blake v. Barnes, 18 N. Y. Supp. 471, 473, 63 Hun 633 (1st Dep't 1892), the ex-
ecutor of the deceased, in an ordinary proceeding before the surrogate involving the
settlement of his account, in which the firm made no claim against the estate, sought an
accounting from the surviving partner. In accord with the principal case, the court
said: ". . . for the reason that the partnership effects are not assets of the testator...
a court of equity has exclusive jurisdiction to adjust partnership accounts between the
surviving partner and the representatives of a deceased partner, and the surrogate's
court has no jurisdiction."
'It would be gross understatement to say that the history of the surrogate's court
reveals a continuous expansion of its powers. The forerunner of the present court can
scarcely be called a court at all. As Judge Werner points out in a discussion of the
history and general jurisdiction of the surrogate's court, in Colonial days the court had
"a jurisdiction more ministerial than judicial, for the judgment of the court in all
important matters was transmitted to the governor or secretary for official ratification ....
The distinguishing features of this jurisdiction were that the granting of letters, the
hearing of accounts, the reckoning of administration and the granting of the final dis-
charge belonged to the governor, and not to any inferior judge." Matter of Runk, 200
N. Y. 447, 453, 94 N. E. 363 (1911) ; Brick's Estate, 15 Abb. Pr. 14 (N. Y. 1862).
'CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1887), Preliminary Note to Chapter XVIII by Throop.
"Only a few and comparatively unimportant additions to the incidental powers of
surrogates are added to those previously existing, and these powers the courts had al-
ready held to be implied from those expressly conferred." REDFIELD, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF SURROGATES' CoURs (7th ed. 1910) p. ccvi. An observation by Judge
Werner in Matter of Runk, supra note 3, points out that the Revisers "left Surrogates'
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which declared that "no surrogate should, under pretext of incidental power
or constructive authority, exercise any jurisdiction whatever, not expressly
given -by some statute of the State." Not until 1914 was 'the section (then
Section 2510) substantially liberalized.7 It was then that the surrogates, in
administering justice in all matters relating to the affairs of decedents, were
empowered: ". . . to try and determine all questions, legal or equitable, arising
between any or all of the parties to any proceeding, or between any party and
any other person . . .brought in by supplemental citation, as to any and all
matters necessary to be determined in order to make a full, equitable and
complete disposition of the matter by such order or decree as justice re-
quires." s  In 1921, the section (now Surrogate's Court Act § 40) was ex-
panded still further by the declaration that the specified power listed in the
subdivisions were to be "In addition to and without limitation or restriction
on . . ." the blanket authority conferred in 1914.9 None of these amend-
ments, however, have changed that "fundamental principle. of our probate
law that a surrogate's court has no jurisdiction of a proceeding to collect a
simple debt, or to enforce a purely contractual obligation or personal duty."1 0
This principle of probate law is the real basis of the surrogate's refusal to
assume jurisdiction in the principal case, since the receipt of assets by the
estate of the deceased partner from the surviving partner is "nothing more
than the collection of a debt."'" "Upon the death of one partner, the title
to the assets and property of the firm passes to the surviving partners as
legal owners. They have complete and exclusive possession and control
over such assets. The representatives of the deceased partner have no
title to the assets and no right to interfere with the administration of the
partnership. They have only an equitable interest in, the distribution of the
surplus remaining after the payments of all debts of the firm."' 2 The liquida-
tion of the firm and the settlement of the deceased partner's estate are inde-
pendent proceedings. The Court of Appeals has held that the personal rep-
resentatives of a deceased partner are not necessary parties to an action,
brought by one claiming to be a surviving partner, to compel an accounting
by a third in possession of the partnership assets.'3
Courts in the category of courts not of records and it is manifesf that their work was
based upon that classification."
'CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1887), Notes to § 2472 by Throop.7NEv YORK LAWs OF 1914, c. 443.
'CoDE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2510.
'SURROGATE'S COURT ACT § 40.
"In re Kalik's Estate, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 16, 20 (Surr. Ct. 1942). Matter of Thomas'
Estate, 235 App. Div. 350, 257 N. Y. Supp. 330 (1st Dep't 1932); Matter of Camp-
bell's Estate, 145 Misc. 389, 260 N. Y. Supp. 285 (Surr. Ct. 1932); Matter of Thoms'
Estate, 165 Misc. 398, 300 N. Y. Supp. 872 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
"Matter of Prince's Will, 141 Misc. 600, 252 N. Y. Supp. 908 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
'In re Kalik's Estate, supra note 10. N. Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 40 (6) provides
that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in wind-
ing up the partnership affairs. That such compensation is a valid debt of the firm is
well established. Didlake v. Roden Grocery Company, 160 Ala. 484, 49 So. 384, 22
L. R. A. (N. S.) 907, 18 Ann. Cas. 430 (1909) ; Preston v. Fitch, 137 .N. Y. 41, 33
N. E. 77 (1893).
"Kade v. Sanitary Fireproofing Co. 257 N. Y. 203, 177 N. E. 421 (1931). Indeed,
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Only when the surviving partner is otherwise interested in the estate, i.e.,
when he is more than a mere stakeholder, will the surrogate's court compel
his submission to its jurisdiction. In the principal case, 14 Surrogate Foley
classified those cases which involve such an "interested" surviving partner
into four groups: (1) Where the surviving partner asserts a claim against
the estate as a creditor, the court will assume jurisdiction as an incident to
the allowance or rejection of his claim to share in the assets of the estate.15
(2) Where the surviving partner is a beneficiary entitled to share in the dis-
tribution of the estate and a question of set-off or counterclaim as against
his liability to the estate as the surviving partner may be tried and deter-
mined. 16 (3) Where the surviving partner is the accounting personal repre-
sentative of the deceased. 17 (4) Where the surviving partner while assert-
ing no claim against the estate, voluntarily appears in the proceeding.' 8 A
surviving partner who does not come within the above four classifications
may insist that-an action for an accounting, involving as it does the rights
of firm creditors, be brought against him in the supreme court.19
It is submitted that unnecessary confusion and litigation have arisen from
a failure on the part of lawyers to appreciate that the broad language of
Section 40, necessary to remove the barriers obstructing complete justice in
it has been held that as to the surviving partners, ". . . the legal representative of the
deceased partner has the status of an ordinary creditor." Underdown v. Underdown, 279
Pa. 482, 124 Ati. 159 (1924).
"In re Kalik's Estate, supra note 10 at pp. 18-19.
'Matter of Raymond v. Davis' Estate, 248 N. Y. 67, 161 N. E. 423 (1928); Il. re
Winter's Estate, 231 App. Div. 519, 248 N. Y. Supp. 104 (3d Dep't 1931); In re
Belden's Will, 143 Misc. 159, 256 N. Y. Supp. 162 (Surr. Ct. 1932). In Davis' Estate,
mtpra, Chief Judge Cardozo held that the claimant was entitled to have his claim tried
"in the forum whose aid he has invoked," and that "liquidation may be ordered by a
decree of the surrogate as an incident to the allowance or rejection of a claim' to share
as creditor in the assets of the estate." (Italics added.)
"In re James' Will, 149 Misc. 135, 266 N. Y. Supp. 781 (Surr. Ct. 1933). The basis ofjurisdiction where the surviving partner is both entitled to share in, and is indebted to,
the estate is well established. As Chancellor Walworth stated in Smith v. Kearney,
2 Barb. Ch. 533, 549 (N. Y. 1848) : ". . . it is against conscience that he should receive
anything out of the fund which is already in his hands, as a debtor to the estate."
"TMatter of Hearns, 214 N. Y. 426, 108 N. E. 816 (1915). It has been held to be
the duty of a surviving partner, who is also an executor, to account in the surrogate's
court on the theory that the executor comes "in both his characters" into the proceedings.
Matter of Eddy's Estate, 175 Misc. 193, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 961 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
'In re Gurevitch's Estate, 166 Misc. 439, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 674 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
Where the surviving partner voluntarily appears, the problem of the principal case is
not present. It is submitted that the following broad language from the above case is
limited to jurisdiction over the subject matter, and is dependent upon the court's first
assuming jurisdiction over the persons before it: ". . . jurisdiction of the Surrogate's
Court in an accounting proceeding is without limitation. In such a proceeding it has
power to take any action necessary to the ascertainment of the assets of the estate of
the deceased. . ....
"Surrogate Foley adds this caveat to those who would attempt to stretch the bounds
of the four groups which he marked out: "Even in this limited class of cases where the
taking of a partnership is merely subordinate to a principal question over which the
Surrogate has undoubted jurisdiction, the power is sparingly exercised." In re Kalik's
Estate, supra note 10, at p. 19.
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the surrogate's court, expanded its jurisdiction in order to concentrate power
essential to the complete settlement of decedents' estates.20 Although the
warning of the Revisers of 1877 has long since been forgotten insofar as it
forbids the exercise of necessary incidental power by the surrogates, 21 the
spirit of their admonition typifies the -reluctance of the surrogates, now armed
with broad powers to administer complete justice, to compete with courts of
general jurisdiction in matters which are not strictly incidental to the ad-
ministration of decedents' estates. With the removal of the statutory metes
and bounds, lawyers have attempted to bring matters ultimately affecting the
settlement of estates before the surrogates only to find, as the principal case
illustrates, that even where the surrogate has "undoubted jurisdiction, the
power is sparingly exercised.
22
Douglas S. Moore
Torts: Injurious falsehood: Non-defamatory words causing harm. -
In Gale v. Ryan, 263 App. Div. 76, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 732 (1st Dep't 1941),
the court reversed an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. The court states that in the complaint it was alleged
that the defendants "as part of a plan or scheme to defraud, deceive and
cheat the government of the United States and of the State of New York
by concealing income derived from the defendant corporations upon which
federal and state taxes were payable for the years 1937 to 1940 inclusive,
'intentionally, willfully and maliciously issued, published and widely circu-
lated, or did cause to be issued, published or widely circulated, or in a reck-
less, careless, negligent and unlawful manner, permitted to be issued, pub-
lished and widely circulated false and fraudulent statements and/or reports
to the governments of the United States and the State of New York and
other persons relating to the wages earned and received by the plaintiff from
the defendant employers.' ")
The plaintiff further alleged that during this time his income was insuffi-
cient to require him to file income tax returns or to pay any income tax and
that by reason of the "false and fraudulent" statements and reports plaintiff
had been and still was exposed to criminal prosecution for the alleged vio-
lations of the federal and state income tax laws and had been and still was
subject to investigations by the federal government with a threat of criminal
" "Concentration of jurisdiction as to decedents' estates . . . is the purpose clearly re-
vealed in the statutory scheme." Chief Judge Cardozo in Matter of Raymond v.
Davis, 248 N. Y. 67, 161 N. E. 423 (1928).
'As Chancellor Walworth observed in Pew v. Hastings, 1 Barb. Ch. 452 (N. Y. 1846)
.. it was afterwards found, however; that the exercise of certain incidental powers
by the courts was absolutely essential to the due administration of justice; and that
the revisers and the legislature had not, by their care and foresight, been able to take
the case of the Surrogates' Courts out of the operation of the general rule."
'-See note 19 supra. One might well contrast the insatiable desire for power by our
administrative boards and commissions, with the reluctance of the surrogates to exercise
the power they actually possess.
'Gale v. Ryan, 263. App. Div. 76, 77, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 732, 733 (1st Dep't 1941).
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indictment; that as a result plaintiff had suffered mental anxiety, nervous
strain and impairment of health, and that his good name, reputation and
gainful employment had been injuriously affected and placed in peril; that
by reason of the "false and fraudulent" staLtements and reports plaintiff had
been prevented from attending to his usual business and had been subjected
to great expense in the procurement of counsel. 2
In reversing the lower court, the Appellate Division pointed out that the
only question for determination was whether the facts constituted a cause
of action3 and not whether the plaintiff might ultimately succeed.
That a cause of action will lie for the malicious dissemination of false
information resulting in special damage to the plaintiff has long been recog-
nized in England4 and in the United States.5 To date, the judiciary has not
seen fit to baptize this new tort but has allowed it to wander nameless
through case after case.6 Undoubtedly the most inclusive name for the tort
is that coined by Salmond 7 and adopted by Prosser,8 "Injurious Falsehood."
The wrong of injurious falsehood is to be distinguished from deceit, slan-
der, libel and negligent use of words, to which torts it is similar but from
which it is distinct.
It is easily distinguished from 'deceit where the misrepresentation must
have been false, known to have been false by the defendant, and made to the
plaintiff, who must have suffered loss in reliance thereon.9
Slander and libel are concerned with defamation ;10 injurious falsehood is
not.' Ironically enough, laudatory statements may be construed as libel
where they were so intended and understood ;12 words seemingly innocent
may in reality be defamatory.13 Injurious falsehood, on the other hand, is
concerned with statements which are not defamatory in any way.
21d. at 77, 734.31d. at 78, 734.4Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524 (where the defendant's publication of certain
words in his newspaper implying that the plaintiff had gone out of business caused
loss of customers) ; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. R. 854 (1861) ;
Barley v. Walford, 9 Q. B. 197, 115 Eng. Rep. R. 1249 (1846); Green v. Button,
2 C. M. & R. 707, 150 Eng. Rep. R. 299 (Exch. 1835).
WMorasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass. 567, 574, 25 N. E. 74, 76, 77 (1890) ; Reid v. Provi-
dence Journal Co., 20 R. I. 120, 125, 37 Atl. 637, 638 (1897).
OPRoSSER, TORTS (1941) 1037.
"tSALMOND, TORTS (3d ed. 1912) § 149.8PROSsER, TORTS (1941) 1037.
9Id. at 705, 706.
'0in defamation, damages are proved through loss of standing in the 'community, while
injurious falsehood is concerned with actual damage. 5ee notes 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and
31, infra.
IlMorasse v. Brochu, supra note 6; Husted v. Husted Co., 193 App. Div. 493, 494,
184 N. Y. Supp. 844, 845 (2d Dep't' 1920); Campbell v. Cunningham Nat. Gas Corp.,
164 Misc. 1, 6, 298 N. Y. Supp. 200, 207 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Reid v. Providence Journal
Co., .rpra note 5, where the court said at page 125, 638: "And that words which are
not in their nature defamatory, while perhaps, if false and malicious and if used by a
person who knows, or ought to know, that special damage will follow, and such damage
does in fact follow, an action of the case may be maintained whatever the nature of
the words, yet cannot be made the basis of an action for libel or slander."
12 See Note (1906) 4 L. R. A. (N. s.) 861 and cases cited.
13Martin v. The Picayune, 115 La. 979, 40 So. 376 (1906). The defendant published
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Four requirements for the negligent use of words were laid down in Inter-
national Products Co. v. Erie Railroad C0.14 One is that the words must
have been addressed directly to the person harmed and that he must act in
reliance thereon to his detriment. In injurious falsehood, the harmful words
are not addressed to the plaintiff and it is not the plaintiff who acts in reli-
ance thereon.
Injurious falsehood is to be compared to slander of title, slander of goods
and trade libels, 15 which are all varieties of this species of injury. It is one
of the group of torts based on the common law rule that an action lies for
the intentional infliction of harm without justification or excuse. 1
The element constituting the tort of injurious falsehood are: (1) the words
must be non-defamatory; (2) the statements complained of must be untrue;
(3) the statements must be made maliciously; and, (4) the plaintiff must
have suffered special damage thereby. 17 The remedy is an action on the case
for damages wilfully and intentionally caused without just occasion or,
excuse.
18
In the first place, the words must be non-defamatory. Obviously, if they
an article in which it was stated that a certain person had been unable to find medical
aid which could help her until she consulted the plaintiff, who, it was imputed, was
quite likely to effect a cure. The plaintiff complained that this was advertising, or at
least would be understood as advertising, and that in spite of the laudatory nature of
the article, harm was certain to result in that it would ruin his reputation that there
had been an advertisement of his abilities.
34244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662 (1927). The court held that liability for loss arising
from wrong information, negligently given, arises only where there is a duty, if one
speaks at all, to give the correct information. There must be knowledge, or its equiva-
lent, that the information is desired for a serious purpose; that he to whom it is given
intends to rely and act upon it; that if false and erroneous he will because of it be
injured in person and property. The relationship of the parties, arising out of contract
or otherwise, must be such that in morals and good-conscience the one has the right
to rely upon the other for information, and the other giving the information owes a
duty to give it with care. Accord, Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174
N. E. 441 (1931) ; Glanzer v. Sheppard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
15An illustration of a trade libel is the statement that the sale of the plaintiff's product
infringes the defendant's patent or copyright, which scarcely can be said to disparage
the title or the quality of the goods. See Hanson v. Hall Mfg. Co., 194 Iowa 1213,
190 N. W. 967 (1922) ; PRossER, TORTS (1941) 1040, 1041.
'
6 Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 132 N. W. 371 (1911) (unfair com-
petition) ; Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909) (unfair competition)
Note (1934) 14 B. U. L. REV. 856.
17Morasse v. Brochu, supra note 5; Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N. Y. 1,
191 N. E. 713 (1934) ; Campbell v. Cunningham Nat. Gas Corp., supra note 11; Cooper
v. Weissblath, 154 Misc. 522, 277 N. Y. Supp. 709 (App. term, 2d Dep't 1935) ; Husted
v. Husted Co., supra note 11; Reid v. Providence Journal Co., supra note 5; Ratcliffe
v. Evans, supra note 4, where the court said at page 527: "That an action will lie for
written or oral falsehoods, not actionable per se nor even defamatory, where they are
maliciously published, where they are calculated in the- ordinary course of things to
produce, and where they do produce, actual damage, is established law. Such an action
is not one of libel or slander, but an action on the case for damage wilfully and inten-
tionally done without justification or excuse, analogous to an action for slander of title."
PROSsER, ToRTs (1941) § 106; SALMOND, ToRTs (3d ed. 1912) § 149; RES-rATEMENT,
TORTS (1939) § 873; Notes, (1934) 4 BROOKLYN L. REV. 95; (1934) 14 B. U. L. REv.
856; (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. RFv. 328.
18See note 17 supra.
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are libelous per se or per quod the proper action is one for defamation,
either libel or slander.19 In the principal case, the alleged words were definite-
ly non-defamatory. The elements of falsehood, 20 malice and special dam-
age2' were also alleged.
Malice in the tort of injurious falsehood is legal malice which does not
simply mean ill-will toward a person, but signifies a wrongful act done
intentionally, without just cause or excuse.22 Some courts have said that
malice will be presumed from the mere fact of the falsehood. 23 The proper
rule, however, seems to be that malice means no more than the simple lack
of justification or excuse.2 In the principal case, it would seem that the
plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to satisfy the requirement of malice. For
from these alleged facts, it might reasonably be inferred that the defendant
should have realized that the plaintiff would be placed in an embarrassing
position, and that there was such utter disregard for plaintiff's rights as to
be equivalent to a malicious intent to cause harm.25
The allegation as to special damage must of necessity be a strict one
since the action of injurious falsehood is essentially one for pecuniary loss. 26
Some courts have held that the pecuniary loss sustained must be specific
as to persons and amounts ;27 it is not enough to show a general decline in
business or income resulting from the falsehood. 28  Since the gist of the
action is special damage, these courts require the allegation of facts which
show wherein the plaintiff has sustained damage, and such damage must be
19A1 Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., supra note 17; Campbell v. Cunningham Nat.
Gas Corp., supra note 11; Husted v. Husted Co., supra note 11; Ratcliffe v. Evans,
supra note 4.20Gale v. Ryan, supra note 1, at 77, 733.2 1Gale v. Ryan, supra note 1, at 77, 734.22Dunn v. Hall, I Ind. 344 (1849); Bowers v. State, 24 Tex. App. 242 (1888);
Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & C. 247, 255, 107 Eng. Rep. R. 1051 (K. B. 1825).;
BLACK, LAW DIcrIoNARY (2d ed. 1910) 750.23Andrew v. Deshler, 45 N. J. L. 167 (1883); New England Oil & Pipe Line Co.
v. Rogers, 154 Okl. 285, 7 P. (2d) 638 (1932); Ontario Ind. Loan Co. v. Lindsay,
4 Ont. 473 (1883).24Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 381, 87 Atl. 927 (1913); Lamb
v. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 422, 125 N. E. 817 (1920) ; Western Counties Manure
Co. v. Lawei Chem. Manure Co., L. R. 9 Ex. 218, 43 L. J. Ex. 171 (1874); Royal
Baking Powder Co. v. Wright, Crossley & Co., 18 Rep. Pat. Cas. 95 (H. L., 1900);
Manitoba Free Press v. Nagy, 27 C. L. T. 783, 39 Can. S. C. Rep. 340, 9 Ann. Cas.
816 (1907) ; PRossan, ToRTs (1941) 1043. Some courts hold that a showing of malice
is unnecessary in the absence of a privilege. See Mowry v. Raabe, 89 Cal. 606, 27
Pac. 157 (1891); George v. Blow, 20 New South Wales 395 (1899) ; Smith, Dis-
paragement of Property (1913) 13 CoL. L. REv. 13, 18-25.25 Shapiro v. La Morta, 40 T. L. R. 201 (Ct. of Appeal, Eng., 1923) where the court I
said at page 203: "It is also malicious if he knows that it is likely to injure, and makes
it recklessly, not caring whether it is true or false."2 6 Hay-ward Farms Co. v. Union Savings Bank & Trust Co., 194 Minn. 473, 260
N. W. 868 (1935); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Wright, Crossley & Co., supra note
24; Evans v. Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624, 114 Eng. Rep. R. 1384 (1844).2 7Wilson v. Dubois, 35 Minn. 471, 29 N. W. 68 (1886) ; Hubbard v. Scott, 85 Ore.
1, 166 Pac. 33 (1917) : Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164, 201 Pac. 352 (1921).2
sShaw Cleaners & Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N. W. 231
(1932) ; Tower v. Crosby, 214 App. Div. 392, 212 N. Y. Supp. 219 (4th Dep't 1925);
Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. 537 (N. Y. 1830).
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distinctly and particularly set out.2 9 The better and more modern view is
that a general falling off of business constitutes special damage and it does
not have to be shown that any particular customers were influenced by the
falsehoods in a manner adverse to the plaintiff.30 In the principal case, the
court seems to have adopted the latter view in holding that the plaintiff ful-
filled the requirement by alleging special damage to his usual business and
gainful employment as well as to his reputation. 31
Although plaintiff alleged mental distress, it would seem, under the pre-
vailing view, that he cannot recover for such suffering, which, although fre-
quently allowed in defamation,3 2 has been very strictly excluded from actions
for injurious falsehood. 33 And if damages are refused for mental distress,
it is apparent that the courts will not allow recovery for ill-health caused by
the mental disturbance. While the situation in New York is not quite clear
on the question of mental distress and resultant physical illness, it has been
established quite clearly that no recovery can be had when mental distress
is the sole harm.34 A later case, however, while approving this doctrine,
held that it was permissible to show mental distress and resulting physical
harms in addition to general damages when the publication was libelous
per se.35 The question as to whether this added recovery will be extended
in New York to cases of non-defamatory words remains to be seen. The
decision in the principal case seems to indicate that an extension may be
expected.
In some states, plaintiff can recover for counsel fees incurred in defending
himself in suits resulting from the falsehood.3 6 This result has been reached
in slander of title cases where the plaintiff has been forced to expend sums
for counsel fees in order to clear the title. It would seem only right that
recovery should be allowed for this expense brought on by the malicious
act of the defendant. In New York, there is some doubt whether damages
can be had for expenses of counsel in prior 37 suits.3 8 Scattered holdings in
29Swan v. Tappan, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 104 (1849); Ward v. Gee, 61 S. W. (2d)
555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).30Ratcliffe v. Evans, supra note 4, at 528.
31There is some question as to whether or not damages can be recovered for in-juries to reputation in injurious falsehood cases. See Bergman v. Jones, 94 N. Y.
51 (1883).32Brooks v. Harrison, 91 N. Y. 83 (1883).33Ebersole v. Fields, 181 Ala. 421, 62 So. 73 (1913) where the court said at page
425: "Mental perturbation suffered, in however immediate consequence of such
false and malicious slander, is not within the range of the special damage . . . in an
action of this character consequential mental distress is not an element of recoverable
special damages." Ward v.-Gee, supra note 29. To the same effect see Gent v. Lynch,
23 Md. 58 (1865) ; Swan v. Tappan, supra note 29.34Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54 (1858).35Garrison v. Sun Printing & Pub. Co., 207 N. W. 1, 100 N. E. 436 (1912). See,
for an excellent discussion on this point with all the cases collected, REPORT OF THE LAW
REvisION ComiIssIox (1936) 377-454; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance
in the Law of Torts (1936) 49 HARV. L. Ray. 1033.3OCollins v. Whitehead, 34 Fed. 121 (C. C. Colo. 1888)'; Womack v. McDonald, 219
Ala. 75, 121 So. 57 (1929) ; Chesebro v. Powers, 78 Mich. 472, 44 N. W. 290 (1889).
37By "prior suits" is meant those suits which the plaintiff was forced to prosecute
or defend to overcome the harm caused by the false statements; for example, to clear
a title beclouded by the defendant.
3sCohen v. Minzeheimer, 118 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1909) ; Raines v. New York
Press Co., 92 Hun 515, 37 N. Y. Supp. 45 (1895).
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New York have permitted the-plaintiff to recover the cost of counsel fees
in prior suits caused by some wrongful act of the defendant such as breach
of contract,39 fraudulent purchase of mortgage, 40 conversion of notes, 41
summary proceedings without justification,42 and injurious falsehood. 43 It
is interesting to note that at least one recent appellate term case on this pre-
cise point has allowed the plaintiff to collect counsel fees incurred in prior
suits. This may indicate a new and more equitable trend.44
Injurious falsehood is a tort that has never been greatly favored in the
law and consequently is subject to all the privileges recognized both in cases
of personal defamation and in those of other types of interference with
economic advantage. 45 A good defense 46 to the charge of injurious false-
hood is just occasion or excuse. Thus it has been held that there is no
liability where there are legitimate purposes in doing a lawful act as well
as malicious ones.47 Consequently an act, though committed in a spirit of
ill-will towards one person, if it is accompanied by a desire to confer a
pecuniary or social benefit upon another, has been held not actionable.48
The more modern view, however, would seem to minimize the effect in most
cases of the defense of just occasion or excuse and indicate that a malicious
motive of itself may make tortious an act otherwise lawful. 49 Thus the oft-
repeated dogma that mere motive cannot make an otherwise lawful act
39Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., 19 App. Div. 297, 46 N. Y. Supp. 120 (1st
Dep't 1897), aff'd on opinion below, 162 N. Y. 628, 57 N. E. 1120 (1900).40Muller v. Rosenblath, 157 App. Div. 513, 142 N. Y. Supp. 602 (2d Dep't 1913).41Hynes v. Patterson, 95 N. Y. 1 (1884).420'Horo v. Kelsey, 60 App. Div. 604, 70 N. Y. Supp. 14 (4th Dep't 1901).43Cooper v. Weissblath, supra note 17 (where the court collects and discusses a large
number of cases on the point from many different jurisdictions).44Cooper v. Weissblath, supra note 17.45Ebersole v. Fields, supra note 33; PRossER, ToRTs (1941) 1045.46It is interesting to note a good defense to injurious falsehood is consent. On this
point, see an analogous case, Marek v. Zanol Products Co., 298 Mass. 1, 9 N. E. (2d)
393 (1937).47Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N. Y. 80, 140 N. E. 203 (1923) One entering a news-
paper publishing business to drive another out as well as to give the public a better
newspaper does not become liable for damages to the displaced publisher. Holbrook v.
Morrison, 214 Mass. 209, 100 N. E. 1111 (1913) The defendant erected a large sign
bearing the words "For Sale. Best Offer from Colored Family." Although intending
to sell the defendant was actuated by ill-will toward the plaintiffs, and by the threat-
ened sale was seriously interfering with their real estate business. An injunction was
denied. Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292 (1883) The defendant erected cheap dwelling
houses and rented them to negroes in order to influence the plaintiff who lived on ad-
joining property to sell to him at a low price. Although the defendant's dominant
motive was to injure the plaintiff, he was receiving real benefit from the houses and
thus was making a beneficial use of his property. The court refused to interfere.4SUnion Labor Hospital Ass'n v. Vance Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 112 Pac. 886(1910) ; Lewis v. Huis-Hodge Lumber Co., 121 La. 658, 40 So. 685 (1908) ; Heywood
v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225 (1883).49Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fed. Res. Bank, 256 U. S. 350, 41 Sup. Ct. 499 (1920)
where the Court said at page 358: "A man has a right to give advice, but advice given
for the sole purpose of injuring another's business and effective on a large scale, might
create a cause of action." Tuttle v. Buck, supra note 16; Al Raschid v. News Syndicate
Co., supra note 17; Beardsley v. Kilmer, supra note 47; Ratcliffe v. Evans, supra note 4.
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unlawfu5 0 continues to yield before the advances of an enlightened juris-
prudence. 51
Now that the tort of injurious falsehood has been recognized in New
York and other states, there remains ,but the problem of carefully delimiting
its scope. The components 'of the tort are such that the courts may readily
become flooded with petty suits of a vindictive nature designed solely to
harass the defendant. Instead of allowing time and litigation to erode the
bulwarks of the malice and special damage allegations, the courts would do
well to enforce them strictly to prevent injurious falsehood from falling
into the disrepute monopolized at the moment by the right of privacy.
George Edward Cotter
Torts: Negligence: Duty of care of possessor of land to police officer
who enters.-A village police officer, the plaintiff's decedent, pursued a pick-
pocket onto the defendant railroad's right of way and there arrested him.
While walking along the right of way to the nearby depot with his prisoner,
the officer was fatally struck by a train backing toward the yards. An
ccunusual number of witnesses" testified that there was no brakeman on the
rear platform of the last coach, that no warning was sounded as the train
approached the depot, that the train was without lights, and that the train
traveled over a hundred feet after hitting the decedent before the brakes
were applied. On a complaint which in two counts alleged negligence, and
wilful and wanton negligence, the trial court directed a verdict for the de-
fendant railroad. The plaintiff administrator appealed. Held: Evidence of
both negligence and wilful and wanton negligence should have been submitted
to the jury; the direction of the verdict was error. Ryaif v. Chicago & N. W.
315 IMI App, 65, 42 N. E. (2d) 128 (1942).
The question of the duty of care owed by a railroad to a police officer
on its right of way, which puzzled the court in the principal case, is but
one aspect of a larger problem, the liability arising out of the maintenance
or use of land. Those possibly subject to liability have an interest in the
exclusive possession and use of their land; those who suffer harm because of
the condition or use of the land have an interest in freedom from harmful
bodily contacts. Alone, each interest is legally recognized; in conflict, legal
protection of one must be qualified by at least a partial recognition of the
other. The problem is thus one of balancing an interest in land, in a society
in which such an interest is traditionally recognized, with an interest in
personal security, likewise long considered of sufficient social importance
to warrant legal protection.
50HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 232; SALMIOND, JURISPRUDENCE (8th ed. 1930) 401.5
'Note (1934) 4 BROOKLYN L. REV. 95.
'The theory was that the decedent police officer "was at most a mere licensee on de-
fendant's right-of-way, and that their relationship was such that the only duty of the
defendant railroad company was not to injure him wantonly or wilfully." 315 Ill App.
65, 70-71, 42 N. E. (2d) 128, 131 (1942).
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Liability, here as elsewhere in the law of torts, may be based upon
(1) intent, (2) negligence, or (3) inherently dangerous activity,2 the second
having caused the most difficulty. Since negligence, by definition, is the
violation of a duty to use reasonable care,3 the existence of a duty is the first
element of liability. This duty of care may be thrust upon the one in con-
trol either (1) in the manner of maintenance of, or (2) in the carrying on of
activities on the land.4
The duty of a person with an interest in land varies according to both his
own status and the status of the party harmed. The former is usually a
possessor of land ;5 the party harmed may be either (1) a person off the land,6
or (2) a person on the land. To those off the land, there is no liability for
harm resulting from natural conditions 7 unless the continuation of such con-
ditions in urban areas amounts to a nuisance." There is, however, liability
for foreseeable harm resulting from artificial conditions 9 or active conduct.10
Those on the land may be either (1) those whose entry or stay on the land
is not rightful or privileged, or (2) those Whose entry or stay is rightful or
privileged. I
2Any of the three might result in an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of the land of another or, with a public right leading to liability for a private or public
nuisance. PROSSER, TORTS (1941) pp. 601-602, 573-587, 566-573. -
3
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 282; HARPEa, LAW OF TORTS (1933) § 68; PROSSER,
TORTS (1941) pp. 175-178.4
"The decisions as to a landowner's liability to persons injured on his property group
themselves into two classes: those in which the injuries are caused by the owner's acts
and those caused by the condition of his premises." BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF
TORTS (1926) pp. 162-163. Note (1912) 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 492.
5 He also might be (1) a vendor of land [RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 372-376;
HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) §§ 100-101; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) pp. 644-648];
(2) a lessor of land [RESTATEIdENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 377-379; HARPER, LAW OF TORTS
(1933) §§ 102-103; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) pp. 648-665]; (3) a trespasser on the land
[RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 380-381]; (4) a member of the possessor's household
[RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 382]; (5) a licensee acting on behalf of the possessor
[RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 383]; or (6) a person on the land other than a pos-
sessor or any of the above [RESTATEMxENT, TORTS (1934) § 386].
6For a discussion of the duties owed to a person off the land, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS
1934 §§ 364-371; HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) §§ 85-87; PROSSER, TORTS (1941)
pp. 601-609.
7RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 364 Caveat to Clause (c) ; Pontardawe Rural District
Council v. Moore-Gwyn [1929] L. R. 1 Ch. 656 (falling rocks) ; Chambers v. Whelan,
44 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 4th 1930) (fall of decayed tree of natural growth upon
public road).8 Whether there is a nuisance depends on the locality, the seriousness of the danger,
and the ease with which it may be prevented. Cases indicating the development of an
exception to the traditional rule that the possessor is under no affirmative duty to remedy
conditions of natural growth on his premises are Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal R. Co.,
199 Wis. 575, 227 N. W. 385 (1929) (fall of tree of natural growth upon sidewalk) and
Brandywine Hundred Realty Co. v. Cotillo, 55 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 3rd 1932) (fall of
dead tree of natural growth upon main highway).
9 RESTATEMFNT, TORTS (1934) §§ 364-366, 368-370; Ettl v. The Land and Loan Co.,
122 N. J. L. 401, 5 A. (2d) 689 (1939) (piling sand where wind may blow it); Weller
v. McCormick, 52 N. J. L. 470, 19 Atl. 1101 (1890) (fall of branch of tree planted by
previous owner upon sidewalk).
10 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 371; Downes v. Silva, 57 R. I. 343, 190 Atl. 42
(1937) (failure to maintain protective barrier around excavation); Weitzmann v.
Barber Asphalt Co., 190 N. Y. 452, 83 N. E. 477 (1908) (operation of hoist cable).
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The person whose entry or stay is not rightful or privileged is a "trespass-
er,"" to whom the possessor is subject to no duty other than not to injure him
wilfully or wantonly.' 2 By the device of defining "wilful and wanton" to
include failure to use reasonable care after a trespasser's presence has been
discovered, a duty of reasonable care to. a "perceived trespasser" has been
established.13 In most jurisdictions,' 4 the probability of the presence of a
trespasser creates no duty to anticipate his presence unless the probability
is very great because of "frequent trespass on a limited area."'15 Because the
status of the "frequent trespasser" is superior to that of the "mere trespasser,"
he has sometimes been called a "tolerated intruder," a "permittee," a "licensee
by acquiescence," or a "tacit licensee."' 6 The infant trespasser is likewise
accorded special protection. If the possessor has a highly dangerous artificial
condition on his land which is attractive to children and induces them to
come upon the land and they do, thereby suffering harm, he is, if the antici-
11RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 329. For a discussion of the duties owed to the
trespasser, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 333-339; HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933)§9 88-94; PROSSER, TORTS pp. 609-625.
12 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 333; Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 130 Eng. Rep. R.
911 (C. P. 1828) (spring-gun) ; Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387, 76 N. E. 474 (1906)
(shooting trespasser). The reasons given for the rule vary. The Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Co. v. Van Benshoten, 120 Ohio St. 438, 166 N. E. 374 (1929) (presence of
trespasser not to be anticipated) ; Boday v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 53 R. I. 207,
165 Atl. 448 (1933) (foreseeability of general trespassing imposes no obligation);
Jeffersonville, Madison, and Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Goldsmith, 47 Ind. 43 (1874) (tres-
passer is contributorily negligent). "The true explanation seems to be merely that, in a
civilization based on private ownership, it is considered a socially desirable policy to
allow a man to use his own land in his own way, without the burden of watching for
and protecting those who come there without permission or right." PROSSER, TORTS
(1941) 611. For a possible explanation of the rule, see BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW
OF TORTS (1926) pp. 162-164.
'
3The Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. Graham, 95 Ind. 286 (1884) ; Hanks
v. Great Northern R. Co., 131 Minn. 281, 154 N. W. 1088 (1915) ; Frederick v. Phila-
delphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 136, 10 A. (2d) 576 (1940). Today the rule is stated
more directly. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 336.
14At least five states require railroads to be on the lookout for trespassers where their
presence is to be anticipated and the activity carried on is highly dangerous. Pickett v.
Wilmington & W. R. Co., 117 N. C. 616, 23 S. E. 264 (1895) ; Cincinnati & Zanesville
R. R. Co. v. Smith, 22 Ohio St. 227 (1871); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Russell, 125
Tex. 443, 82 S. W. (2d) 948 (1935); ARK. Din. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §11144; TENN.
CODE (Michie, 1942) § 2628(4).
1 5 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 334-335; BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS
(1926) p. 179 et seq. Thomas v. Southern Ry. Co., 92 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 5th 1937) ;.
Smith v. Boston & Me. R. R., 87 N. H. 246, 177 Atl. 729 (1935). Contra: Jackson v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 176 Md. 1, 3 A. (2d) 719 (1939) ; Ward v. Southern Pac. Co.,
25 Ore. 423, 36 Pac. 166 (1894); Boday v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 53 R. 1. 207,
165 Atl. 448 (1933).
16Kremposky v. Mt. Jessup Coal Co., Ltd., 266 Pa. 568, 109 Atl. 766 (1920) ; Excel-
sior Wire Rope Company, Limited, v. Callan, [1930] A. C. 404, 142 L. T. Rep. 531.
BOHLEN,* STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) pp. 176-181; Note (1939) 120 A. L. R.
1068. But see Robert Addie and Sons (Collieries) Limited v. Dumbreck, [1929] A. C.
358, 140 L. T. Rep. 650, where Lord Chancellor Hailsham said at 364, 651: "It was sug-
gested in argument that there was a fourth category of persons who were not on the
premises with the leave or licence of the occupier, but who were not pure trespassers.
I cannot find any foundation for this suggestion either in British or in Scotch law,
and I do not think that the category exists."
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pated harm outweighs the inconvenience of guarding against it, subject to
liability for maintaining an "attractive nuisance."1 7
The privilege of those whose entry or stay is rightful or privileged may
result (1) from the consent of the possessor,' 8 or (2) irrespective of consent,
by operation of law.19 He whose privilege is consensual in origin-whether
by "permission" or "invitation" is today immaterial2Q-is either (1) a
"licensee" 21 or (2) a "business visitor, '22 depending upon the lack of or
existence of interest in the possessor in the visit.
Toward the "licensee," the possessor in the carrying on of his activities
owes a duty of reasonable care,2 and in the maintenance of the land a duty to
warn of the risk of known dangers.24 If the possessor is benefited by the
"7RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 339. Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29 (1841) (child
playing on wagon in public street) ; Railroad Company v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (U. S.
1873); Gimmestad v. Rose Bros. Co., Inc., 194 Minn. 531, 261 N. W. 194 (1935);
Cooke v. Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland, [1909] A. C. 229, 100 L. T. Rep.
626. Contra: Urban v. Central Massachusetts Electric Co., 301 Mass. 519, 17 N. E.
(2d) 718 (1938); Ryan v. Towar, 128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 644 (1901); Morse v.
Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N. Y. 110, 19 N. E. (2d) 981 (1939) ; Hannan v. Ehrlich,
102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N. E. 504 (1921); cf. Parnell v. Holland Furnace Co., 260 N. Y.
604,,184 N. E. 112 (1932). It is not necessary that the children's presence be caused
by the dangerous condition. RESTATEMNIENT, TORTS (1934) § 339, Comment on Clause
(a) a. But see United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Van Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct.
299 (1921). Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering without Permission
(1898) 11 HARv. L. REv. 349, 434; Hudson, The Turntable Cases in the Federal Courts
(1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 826; Note (1925) 36 A. L. R. 34.1 8 RESTATEmENT, ToRTs (1934) c. 8, Scope Note, §§ 167-190.
19 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 191-211.2 0RESTATEMENT,' TORTS (1934) § 330, Comment a. Cf. Sweeny v. Old Colony and
Newport Railroad Co., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368 (1865) where Chief Justice Bigelow
stated (at 374) what was then the "true distinction": "A mere passive acquiescence by
an owner or occupier in a certain use of his land by others involves no liability; but if
he directly or by implication induces persons to enter on or pass over his premises, he
thereby assumes an obligation that they are in a safe condition suitable for such use,
and for a breach of this obligation he is liable in damages to a person injured thereby."2 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 330. The Restatement labels any licensee other than
a business visitor, a "gratuitous licensee." Id. § 331. Bohlen calls him a "bare licensee."
BOHLEN, STUDES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 171. For a discussion of the duties owed
to the licensee, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§, 340-342; HARPER, LAW OF TORTS
(1933) §§ 95-96; PROSsER, TORTS (1941) pp. 625-636. The social guest is treated as a
licensee. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 331, Comment a (3) ; Greenfield v. Miller, 173
Wis. 184, 180 N. W. 834 (1921); Note (1921) 12 A. L. R. 982.2 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 332. For a discussion of the duties owed to the business
visitor, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 340-341, 343-344; HARPER, LAW OF TORTS
(1933) §§ 97-98 (called "invitees") ; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) pp. 635-644.
2 3 0n the theory that the permission given may have been accepted and the licensee
may be present. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 341; Smithwick v. Pacific Electric Ry.
Co., 206 Cal. 291, 274 Pac. 980 (1929) ; Pomponio v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 66
Conn. 528, 34 AtI. 491 (1895) ; O'Brien v. Union Freight R. Co., 209 Mass. 449, 95
N. E. 861 (1911); Barry v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 92 N. Y. 289 (1883) ; cf. Weitz-
mann v. Barber Asphalt Co., 190 N. Y. 452, 83 N. E. 477 (1908).24 RESTATEMIENT, TORTS (1934) § 342; Smith v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 333 Mo.
314, 62 S. W. (2d) 761 (1933) ; Campbell v. Boyd, 88 N. C. 129 (1883). The doctrine
of "attractive nuisance" applies a fortiori to infant licensees. Petree v. Davison-Paxon-
Stokes Co., 30 Ga. App. 490, 118 S. E. 697 (1923) ; even in those industrial states where
not applied to infant trespassers (see supra. note 17). Sarapin v. S. & S. Corrugated
Paper Machinery Co., 209 App. Div. 377, 204 N. Y. Supp. 778 (2d Dep't 1924).
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privileged entry, the status of the entrant is superior to that of a "licensee."
As a "business visitor," he enjoys an additional right that reasonable'care
be exercised either to make the land safe for his reception or to warn him
of reasonably ascertainable dangers.26
The status of those whose privilege or entry arises irrespective of the con-
sent of the possessor, such as a police officer or fireman who comes upon the
land in the exercise of a legal privilege and performance of a public duty,
is obscure.27 In the principal case, the court, at first assuming that the police
officer was a "mere licensee," cited Neice v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co.,28
which held that the running in the night, without warning signals, of a dark
train near a depot was evidence of wilful and wanton negligence toward a
,trespasser on the depot platform, as authority for the conclusion that such
conduct would also be wilful and wanton negligence toward a police officer
on the right of way near a depot.29 The court then expressly held that the
police officer was "neither trespasser nor mere licensee" and, as one "right-
fully on defendant's right-of-way . . . upon business which required his
presence there," was owed the duty of "reasonable care.' '3 0 The court, citing
Bohlen, ' Prosser, 2 and the Restatement of Torts,33 suggests that the police
officer was more than a "mere licensee" since: (1) The privilege of entry
existed irrespective of the consent of the possessor who had no right to exclude
him; (2) He was present "upon business which required his f resence there."
To infer from the latter phrase that the court thought that the entry of the
police officer to catch a~culprit who snatched the purse of one to whom the
carrier owed no duty benefited the railroad would certainly be far-fetched,
especially since the court went on to declare that "a worn out formula based
on feudal customs which have passed away" should not be the basis for
decision.3 4 In short, the court recognized that policemen do not fit very well
2 5Most courts thrust the duty as the price of the economic benefit which might result
from the visit. Tryon v. Chalmers, 205 App. Div. 816, 200 N. Y. Supp. 362 (3d Dep't
1923) ; Markman v. Fred P. Bell Stores Co., 285 Pa. 378, 132 Atl. 178 (1926). Some
courts go to great length to find the economic advantage. Gilliland v. Bondurant, 332
Mo. 881, 59 S. W. (2d) 679 (1933) (tourist visiting factory) ; Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v. Hopkins, 200 Ill. 122, 65 N. E. 656 (1902) (relative bringing workman his lunch).
Other courts imply from the "invitation" to enter a representation that reasonable care
has been exercised to make the premises safe. Durning v. Hyman, 286 Pa. 376, 133
Atl. 568 (1926). For a clear statement of the rule, see Hall v. State, 173 Misc. 903.
19 N. Y. S. (2d) 20 (Ct. Cl. 1940). Notes (1926) 43 A. L. R. 866, (1928) 53
A. L. R. 855.2 6RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 343; Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. 1 C. P. 274 (1866),
aft'd, L. R. 2 C. P. 311 (1867). Haefeli v. Woodrich Engineering Co., 255 N. Y. 442,
175 N. E. 123 (1931).27 BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) p. 156 et seq.; HARPER, LAW OF
TORTS (1933) p. 224; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) pp. 628-629.
28254 Ill. 595, 98 N. E. 989 (1912).
29315 Ill. App. 65, 76-77, 42 N. E. (2d) 128, 133 (1942).
01d. at 77, 133.31 BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) pp. 156-201 (duties of landowner
toward those entering premises of their own right).
"
2PROSSER, TORTS (1941) pp. 628, 630-631 (duties of occupiers of land toward licensees).
33 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 204 (privilege of entry to arrest criminal).34
"A rule of law which holds one thus upon the land of another is a mere licensee
is like putting 'new wine into old bottles'. The complex and difficult questions of right
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into any of the established categories-a valid conclusion. They are not
"trespassers" since they are privileged to enter. Nor are they, strictly speak-
ing, "licensees" or "btfsiness visitors" since the privilege exists irrespective
of the consent of the possessor. If the lawful carrying on of the possessor's
business requires the presence of the public officer-customs, 35 tax,36 and
sanitary3 7 inspectors are examples-consent can be implied, and sufficient
similarity exists to warrant classification of the officer as a "business visitor."3 8
Often stated in the cases is the generalization that if the entry of the public
officer benefits the possessor, he is a "business visitor" ;9 if not, a "licensee,"
40
to whom there is no duty to make safe any part of the premises,41 except
prepared approaches. 42 Under this view, postmen,43 garbage collectors,4 4
and city water meter-readers 45 have been classified as "business visitors";
policemen46 and firemen47 usually as "licensees."
To hold that those public officers, the time and place of whose visits are
generally if not specifically foreseeable, have a status superior to that of tile
arising out of our modern civilization cannot be decided by a worn out formula based
on feudal customs which have passed away." 315 Ill. App. 65, 75, 42 N. E. (2d) 128, 132
(1942).35Low v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 72 Me. 313 (1881); Wilson v. Union Iron Works Dry
Dock Co., 167 Cal: 539, 140 Pac. 250 (1914).3GAnderson & Nelson Distilleries Co. v. Hair, 103 Ky. 196, 44 S. W. 658 (1898).37Cudahy Packing Co. v. McBride, 92 F. (2d) 737 (C. C. A. 8th 1937) ; Mitchell v.
Barton & Co., 126 Wash. 232, 217 Pac. 993 (1923) ; see Boneau v. Swift & Co., 66 S. W.
(2d) 172 (Mo. App. 1934).3 8RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 345, Comment d; PRossER, ToRTs (1941) pp. 628-629.
39See supra notes 43, 44, 45.40See supra notes 46, 47.41See supra notes 46, 47.42Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491 (1920), criticized in
Notes (1920) 34 HARv. L. REv. 87; (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 93; approved in Note (1920) 20
COL. L. Rv. 805; accord, Learoyd v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315 (1885) (entry requested) ;
cf. Wynn v. Sullivan, 294 Mass. 562, 3 N. E. (2d) 236 (1936). BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE
LAW OF ToRTs (1926) pp. 156-201.43Sutton v. Penn, 238 Ill. App. 182 (1925), approved in Note (1926) 26 COL. L. REV.
116; Young v. Peoples Gas & Electric Co., 128 Iowa 290, 103 N. W. 788 (1905) ; Gordon
v. Cummings, 152 Mass. 513, 25 N. E. 978 (1890) ; Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 S. W.
(2d) 369 (1936) ; Burt Furniture Co. v. Smith, 37 Ohio App. 470, 175 N. E. 209 (1929)..44Toomey v. Sanborn, 146 Mass. 28, 14 N. E. 921 (1888).45Kennedy v. Heisen, 182 Ill. App. 200 (1913) ; Finnegan v. Fall River Gas-Works,
159 Mass. 311, 34 N. E. 523 (1893).46Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227, 281 Pac. 371 (1929) ; Casey v. Adams, 234 Ill. 350,
84 N. E. 933 (1908) ; Brennan v. Keene, 237 Mass. 556, 130 N. E. 82 (1921) ; Burroughs
Adding Machine Co. v. Fryar, 132 Tenn. 612, 179 S. W. 127 (1915); Notes L. R. A.
1916B 792; (1921) 13 A. L. R. 637; (1929) 61 A. L. R. 1028.47Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203 (1910) ; Gibson
v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N. E. 182 (1892) ; Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131
AtI. 44 (1925) ; Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N. E. (2d) 1008
(1936), criticized in Note (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 265; Hamilton v. Minneapolis
Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N. W. 693 (1899); Beehler v. Daniels, 18 R. I. 563, 29
At. 6. (1894), Id., 19 R. I. 49, 31 AtI. 582 (1895). But cf. Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell
Commercial Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. 358 (1899) ; Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna,
146 Tenn. 389, 242 S. W. 646 (1922) (where fireman was called from neighboring mum-
cipality); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. O'Leary, 136 S. W. 601 (Tex. 1911)
(where premises were put in dangerous use).
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"licensee" and approximating that of the "business visitor" would seem to be
correct. The test of economic benefit might well be discarded as irrelevant in
fixing the duty owed to such a public officer. 0
The cases, other than those involving "business visitors," or public officers
properly vested with the same rights because their visits are equally fore-
seeable, present a conflict between the principles of negligence and the tradi-
tional immunity of landowners. 48 It is often said, for example, that actual
knowledge of the presence of the "trespasser" must exist before any duty
of care is owed to him.49 Likewise, the possessor must be aware of danger-
ous conditions on the land before he is subject to liability to "licensees." 50
Loss other than that resulting from Active conduct is shifted only where there
has been subjective negligence.51 Where there is foreseeability of harm, the
particular landowner is privileged, to the extent that his awareness is sub-
normal, to ignore the probable presence of others on his land. But the police-
man or fireman whose entry is neither specifically nor generally foreseeable,
is in a far different position from the "trespasser," "licensee," "business vis-
itor," or public officer whose entry resembles the entry of the "business
visitor." 52 Yet the court in the principal case thrusts upon the possessor of
land a duty to anticipate the presence of a policeman simply because of the
nature of the latter's privilege, disregarding the question of foreseeabilit3
of entry under it.
In the one class of cases, the possessor may with immunity fail to epitomize
the "reasonable man under like circumstances" ;53 in the other, he must excel
him or be subject to liability. Such a paradox is the result of a conceptual
approach which ignores both the elementary principles of negligence and the
traditional immunity of the landowner. But the solution of the problem, at
least in the abstract, is simple. In the relation of the possessor of land to
the policeman or fireman thereon, let the general rules of negligence apply un-
4 8
BoHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 163. The immunity protects only
the possessor or those acting on his behalf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 333, Com-
ment b, §§ 384-385.49See supra note 15.5
°See supra note 24.51Subjective negligence because it is more of a state of mind than a description of con-
duct is not the general test of liability for negligence. "The law takes no account of the
infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education which make the internal charac-
ter of a given act so different in different men. It does not attempt to see men as God
sees them, for more than one sufficient reason .... But a more satisfactory explanation
is, that, when men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual
peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare. If, for
instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting him-
self or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in the couris of
Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from
guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to
their standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his personal equation
into account." HOLMES, THE CommoN LAW (1881) 108.5 2RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 345; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) pp. 628-629. For a dis-
cussion of the duties owed to persons entering in exercise of a privilege independent
of the possessor's consent, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 345-346; BOHLEN, STUDIES
IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) pp. 156-201; HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) §§ 96, 98;
PROSSER, TORTS (1941) pp. 628-630.53See supra notes 12, 15, 24.
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mitigated by any immunity from liability.54 For cases where these rules
would not provide adequate protection for public officers injured in the per-
formance of their public duties by shifting the loss, some public risk-dis-
tributing scheme, if further protection seems socially desirable, could be es-
tablished.55 To accept the holding of the principal case is to make the pos-
sessor of land strictly liable for failing to anticipate the presence of one whose
entry cannot reasonably be foreseen, which, it is submitted, is an undesira-
ble extension of liability.
Harry George Henn
Trusts: Liability of a trustee where control over his acts or the trust
property is vested in another.-The general principles governing the liabili-
ty of a trustee to the beneficiary are well settled. In recent years, however, a
new situation has arisen, to which the ordinary rules cannot be applied. The
settlor frequently provides in the instrument creating the trust that the trustee
shall be subject to some measure of control by.another person who is not a
co-trustee. Judging from the number of reported cases, such provisions were
rare prior to 1930, but since that date they have increased in frequehcy. The
obvious advantages of this device make it appear likely that it will soon be
fairly common.'
In trusts of this general type, X, the person who has control over the trus-
tee's actions, is either the settlor himself (in which case an almost complete
power of control may be reserved), or a relative to whom a veto power is
given. In the latter type, the provision is that the trustee may buy and sell
with the consent of X. In a very few cases, X is a stranger, an expert in invest-
ment matters, and is substantially the investment manager of the trust, while
the trustee is a mere custodian. 2 The question which these trusts raise is
the effect of this modification of the trustee's power upon his liability.
As to the liability of the trustee, where he acts without X's consent, the basic
principle is that any expense or loss incurred as a result of the trustee's act
would be cause for a surcharge 3 In Matter of Hammersley,4 the court found
that the trustee was at fault in not obtaining X's approval, but refused to sur-
charge him in the absence of any showing of gross negligence or bad faith.
54The Restotement gives the persons entering in the exercise of a privilege independent
of the possessor's consent, unless their presence is necessary to the lawful conduct of the
latter's business, a status similar to that of the licensee if the possessor "knows that they
are upon the land or are likely to enter it in the exercise of their privilege." REsTATE-
MENT, ToRTs (1934) §§ 345-346. The court in the principal case ignored this latter
requirement.
55Notes (1920) 34 HARv. L. REv. 87; (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 93.
'See Carpenter, Trust Investment Management under Discretionary Powers (1936)
62 TRUST Co. MAG. 579, 583, and Note (1934) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 280.2Public Trustee's Act (1906) 6 EDw. VII, c. 55, 4 and comment thereon in (1927)
163 L. T. 229 and (1935) 79 L. J. 247.
a1 re Jacob's Estate, 320 Pa. 539, 183 Atl. 49 (1936) ; Corbett v. Benioff, 126 Cal.
App. 772, 14 P. (2d) 1028 (1932) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 185.
4152 Misc. 903, 274 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
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The case may be distinguished on the basis of the provision in the will per-
mitting the trustee to invest "without responsibility (except for gross negli-
gence or bad faith)," but the court's language indicates that the result would
be the same, without the clause.
In some cases, the trustee is saved by the subsequent approval of X, which
most courts deem as effective as a contemporaneous approval. 5 A sharp distinc-
tion should be drawn, in these cases, between a ratification which relates
back, making the trustee's act lawful, and a refusal to act by one in posses-
sion of knowledge of the situation, which estops him from questioning the
lawfulness of the trustee's act.
In Matter of Rolston,6 the will required the written consent of the life
beneficiary for any change in the investments of the estate. The life bene-
ficiary consented orally to certain investments,' but refused to consent in
writing. Since the consent was oral, the court ruled that the trustee could be
surcharged for investments made without the written consent of the life
beneficiary. The latter was held to be estopped from receiving income earned
by the corpus as increased by the surcharge, while the rights of the ultimate
beneficiaries against the trustee were preserved. The case clearly demonstrates
the distinction between ratification, which affects all parties, and estoppel,
which binds only the one estopped, for here an act ineffective as a consent
resulted in an estoppel.
If the trustee acts with the consent, or under the orders, of X, he is not
liable.7 Complete freedom from liability is illustrated by the cases where the
settlor, while vesting title in the trustee, reserves a complete power of control,
52 Scorr, TRUSTS (1939) 978. Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Schram, 123. F (2d)
579 (C.C.A. 6th 1941). Here a third party sought to make the trust estate liable for
an assessment on stock purchased by the trustee without consent. The court found that
the transaction was voidable only, and a subsequent consent ratified it. The estate was
held liable. In re Jacob's Estate, supra note 3. Dewey v. Burke, 246 Mass. 435, 141
N. E. 117 (1923) (where X, by the terms of the will, was a judge of the probate court).
In re Lieber's Estate, 39 D. & C. 429 (Pa. 1940), aff'd 342 Pa. 246, 20 A. (2d) 193
(1941). Here, despite the fact that the will permitted the trustee to buy with the
consent of X, "first obtained, but not otherwise," the court implied a subsequent con-
sent from X's refusal to reply to the trustee's requests for her approval. The case,
which in the light of the positive words of the will seems to go too far, may be ex-
plained by the court's finding [at 431] that she was either negligent or intended "to
place the trustee in an equivocal position by exposing it to criticism at a future date
no matter what action it took."
Contra: Matter of Hammersley, 152 Misc. 903, 274 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Surr. Ct. 1936),
in which it is held that the approval must be contemporaneous with the investment.
There the trustees were required to accouifit, not to the beneficiary, but to the executors
for the time being, who must approve each investment. The testator's use of the phrase
"executors for the time being" is a sufficient basis of distinction.
6162 Misc. 194, 294 N. Y. Supp. 112 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
7l1 re Tacob's Estate, tuPra note 3; In re Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co.,
181 La. 207, 159 So. 325 (1935) (where X delegated the power to Y who approved) ;
Chase National Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 246 Atp. Div. 201, 284 N. Y. Sup.
472 (1st D'ep't 1935), aff'd, 271 N. Y. 602, 3 N. E. (2d), 205 (1936), rearg. denied, 271
N. Y. 659, 3 N. E. (2d) 472 (1936) ; Reeve v. Chase National Bank. 247 App. Div. 515.
287 N. Y. Supp. 937 (1st Dep't 1936); Matter of Langdon, 154 Misc. 252, 277 N. Y.




with the result that the trustee is little more than a custodian." The cases
place upon the settlor the responsibility and consequent liability which the
trustee would ordinarily have. The trustee, in this situation, has as his chief
duties obedience to the settlor's orders and the safekeeping of the trust prop-
erty. There are dicta to the effect that he must see to it that the settlor
neither exceeds his powers nor violates his own fiduciary duties.9 Other dicta
would hold the trustee liable for losses resulting from bad faith or negligence
of the settlor, where the trustee knows of the misconduct.' 0
But, in the case where X has a power of approval, the trustee must rely
more upon his own discretion and, therefore, has a greater responsibility. If
the trustee is aware of X's negligence in vetoing his proposals there is a posi-
tive duty upon him to protest. Merely suggesting to X that he is negligent
is not enough. If X persists, the trustee should bring the matter before the
court for instructions."-
The foregoing discussion indicates that when the trustee's power is limited,
his responsibility is also limited. Since a portion of the trustee's power is
transferred to X, X must also assume a burden of responsibility. The set-
tlor cases, in which he is treated as a trustee, make this clear. But a more
difficult question is: When will X be liable where he has merely a power to
approve or disapprove the trustee's acts? No cases have been found in which
this question is discussed, even indirectly. The only authority, the Restate-
ment of Trusts, states that liability depends upon all the circumstances of
the case and that no exact rules can be laid down.' 2 As a practical matter,
the courts probably will follow the other cases in determining the question
of what constitutes negligence. This, of course, will be affected by such
considerations as X's experience and knowledge in investment, especially as
known to the settlor; his compensation; whether or not X is a professional
trustee; the quantum of his power under the trust instrument; and the nature
of his relationship with the trustee in the administration of the trust.
Ellis I. Freedinan?*
SAmes v. Bank of Nutley, 118 N. J. Eq. 228, 178 Atl. 363 (1935), aff'd, 119 N. J. Eq.
466, 183 Atl. 172 (1936) ; Reeve v. Chase National Bank, supra note 7; Carrier v.
Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 123 N. E. 135 (1919) ; Chandler v. Commissioner of. Internal
Revenue, 119 F. (2d) 623 (C.C.A. 3d 1941).
92 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) 978.
10 Ames v. Bank of Nutley and Carrier v. Carrier, both supra note 8; Reeve v. Chase
National Bank, supra note 7; 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) 978.
'lMatter of Cross, 115 N. J. Eq. 611, 172 Atl. 212 (1934), rev'd on other grounds,
117 N. J. Eq. 429, 176 Atl. 101 (1935). The case can be distinguished on the ground
that X was a co-executor, but the language of the court was broad enough to apply to
this situation, which clearly should be governed by the same principles. The court
said at 615, 214: "The direction of the testator that the stock was not to be sold without
the consent of his brother, ceased to be a shield when the estate became endangered by
his conduct."
12 RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 185, Comment d.
*Third-year student, not a member of the QUARTERLY staff.
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